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ABSTRACT

Author: Lu, Wei. PhD
Institution: Purdue University
Degree Received: August 2018
Title: The Dissolution and Redemption of the Self in Shakespeare’s Four Main Tragedies
Major Professor: Charles Ross, Sandor Goodhart

From the Pre-Platonic Greek culture to the Renaissance, history witnesses the shift from the care
of the self, to a renunciation of self, and back to an articulated concern for the self. These
changes in how people understood their identity culminate in Shakespeare’s tragedies. It is the
purpose of my project to investigate and extend beyond the current thinking about Shakespeare
and philosophy. Current scholarship tends to agree with Stanley Cavell’s Disowning Knowledge,
which sets Shakespeare’s work in a climate of skepticism. My work argues that a more positive
account of moral philosophy better explains the nature of the self in Shakespeare's tragedies. In
Macbeth, Othello, and Hamlet, Shakespeare presents the trajectories about how the tragic heroes
lose themselves by avoiding respectively the questions about "what one is," "who one is," and
"what manner of man one should be." In King Lear, however, the hope of redemption is finally
found, and the possibility of redeeming oneself lies in one's ethical relation with others.
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

1.1

Cavell's Reading of Shakespeare's Tragedies

From the Pre-Platonic Greek culture to the Renaissance, history witnessed the shift from the care
of the self, to the renunciation of self, and back to an articulated concern for the self. These
changes in how people understood themselves culminate in Shakespeare's plays, particularly his
tragedies. It is the purpose of my project to investigate and extend beyond the current thinking
about Shakespeare and philosophy. Current scholarship tends to agree with Stanley Cavell's
Disowning Knowledge, which sets Shakespeare's plays in a climate of skepticism. My work
argues that a more positive account of moral philosophy better explains the nature of the self in
Shakespeare.
In Disowning Knowledge, Cavell points out the conflict standing at the center of
Shakespeare's tragedies: the impossibility to know versus the temptation to know, and he
contends that Shakespeare dramatizes the problematic put forth by skepticism: the lack of
certainty about the world, oneself, relation with others as well as everything else upon which one
can ground oneself. By skepticism, Cavell distinguishes Montaigne's skepticism and "Descartes's
way of raising the questions of God's existence and of the immortality of the soul," and he
interprets the problematic in Shakespeare’s plays in light of the latter. "The issue posed," Cavell
writes, "is no longer, or not alone, as with earlier skepticism, how to conduct oneself best in an
uncertain world; the issue suggested is how to live at all in a groundless world" (3).
Cavell's reading of Shakespeare's plays is not confined to the epistemological level but
extends to the ethical level as well. Cavell argues that Shakespeare's heroes are obsessed with
knowing the unknowable others, become bogged down in such obsession, and refuse to
acknowledge others. To "overcome knowing," Cavell writes, "is a task Lear shares with Othello
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and Macbeth and Hamlet, one crazed by knowledge he can neither test nor reject, one haunted by
knowledge whose authority he cannot impeach, one cursed by knowledge he cannot share" (96).
According to Cavell, Shakespeare does not provide a solution concerning how to fulfill the task,
nor does the playwright restore meaning to existence. The remedy Cavell himself brings up is to
willingly "forgo knowing" (95) and open oneself to accept and acknowledge the unknowable
others.
Concerning Cavell's reading, three questions remain debatable. First, is Shakespeare
dealing with a "groundless world" (3) or with a world full of uncertainties in the Montaignian
sense? Second, if "to forgo knowing" the unknowable other is the remedy as Cavell argues, how
can the tragic heroes forgo knowing? Third, how does Shakespeare interpret and respond to the
problematic raised by skeptics? Does he merely dramatize the problematic without giving a
solution?
These three questions are connected with and finally boil down to the Delphic maxim:
"know thyself." Although the connotations of the maxim keep evolving from the Greco-Roman
period to the point Shakespeare wrote his plays (and to the modern world), one thing remains
unchanged: the maxim is not merely about knowing oneself, but also about knowing that which
one can ground oneself. The discussion about the ground of the world is always already related
to the maxim of know thyself. Besides, the way one understands oneself affects the way one
conducts oneself in the world and with other people. In Shakespeare’s plays, when the tragic
heroes stop seeking self-knowledge about what it means to be a person, their position in the
world changes, along with their relation to others. By staging the consequence of the lack of selfknowledge, Shakespeare urges his readers to reflect on their own life and to recall the ancient
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aphorism “know thyself” that engages philosophers for centuries. I shall argue that this is also
the response Shakespeare provides to the problematic brought up by the skeptics.
This chapter traces the development of the conception of the self from the Greco-Roman
tradition to the Renaissance and Reformation, with an emphasis on studies of the self by Sir
James Perrott, Montaigne, and Bacon. It aims to set the theoretical framework about the
conception of the self, and prepare for the discussion about how Shakespeare joins in the
conversation with the Christian Humanists and the skeptics. The two main questions to be
answered are: first, to what extent Shakespeare's exploration of the self fits in the framework set
up by Sir James Perrott about "knowing thyself" and to what extent he challenges and departs
from it; second, how does Shakespeare interpret the relation between power and self-knowledge,
and responds to the uncertainties raised by the skepticisms?

1.2

The Concept of the Self in Greco-Roman Culture

In Alcibiades I, Plato defines the self as that which consists of two parts: the same and identity.
The same includes one’s “own body[ies], soul[s], thought[s], conduct, and way of being"
(Foucault 18); and identity is connected with the "plateau," through the contemplation of which
one finds the rules one can model after. Accordingly, the understanding of self is constituted
through the understanding of its relation with the interior (the same), and its relation with the
exterior (either with the divine reference or with the sign system). Self is the subject of one's
action and the object of knowledge.
During the first centuries in the Greco-Roman culture, as Foucault observes, attention
focused on the care of the self. Epictetus, for instance, regards the care of the self as "a privilege
of duty" (Foucault 47), and argues that the reasoning faculty belonging only to man makes
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possible the contemplation and heeding of oneself. One’s relation to his self is defined as taking
care of it and putting it under close examination for fear of disturbance. The practice of the care
of the self during this period includes two types: 1. The care of the body, by keeping health
routines and taking physical exercises; 2. The care of the soul by meditations, reading, writing
and conversing with others. One has to take care of both his body and his soul because the
condition of one would affect that of the other, and the illness will "circulate between the body
and the soul" (57). The same as the body that suffers from sickness, the ailing soul is also in need
of treatment, but different from the illness of the body, the disease of the soul usually goes
unnoticed. One important method of self-cultivation is to envisage one's soul in a state of
sickness and need. To know oneself plays a consequential role in the care of the self.
Foucault lists three different methods used by Greek philosophers for self-knowledge.
First, self-testing. Through the practice of abstinence, one can have an idea of how he/she can
resist the enticement of all that is "not indispensable and essential" (59). Second, selfexamination, namely, one plays the role of a spectator on oneself, and evaluates one's behavior
for virtue acquisition. Third, screening the objects of thought. One has to distinguish the ideas
that depend on oneself and those that do not so as to avoid being attached to what is beyond one's
control. Besides the solitary examination of the self, interpersonal exchanges such as those
between friends, teachers, and students, family members also occupy an essential place in selfcultivation and can intensify social relations.
The ultimate purpose of the care of the self in the Greco-Roman culture is to establish a
proper relationship with one's self, act as one's own master, and "delight in oneself" (66). Such
purpose necessitates the understanding of oneself. It requires one to assess one's behavior
continually, and distinguish the representations coming from outside and those from inside.

5
1.3

"Self" in the Early Christian Culture

From the Greco-Roman culture in the first two centuries A.D. to the Christian culture in the
fourth and fifth centuries A.D., the attention to the care of the self is switched to knowing
oneself, especially knowing one’s standing in relation to God. “Know yourself,” Foucault writes,
“meant ‘do not suppose yourself to be a god” (19). One of the key arguments Foucault makes in
“Technologies of the Self” is that the care of one’s self cannot fit with the newly developed
Christian demand on asceticism and self-renunciation. Self-examination, which was a private
activity for self-cultivation in the Greco-Roman tradition, turns into a public exposure and
becomes fundamental for the purpose of renouncing one’s self in Christian spirituality. If the
relation with one's self is more about an internal relation in the former tradition, then such
relation depends mostly on the external power in the latter.
In Plutarch’s treatise on self-examination, for instance, the emphasis is on looking for the
truth within oneself. At the same time “listening to the voice of the master,” the disciple is
required to pay heed to the “voice of reason in [one]self.” The same as Plutarch, Seneca brings
forth the necessity of private occupation with oneself, and he writes in Epistles about the habit of
inspecting his conscience closely at the end of each day as a form a self-assessment. The
exagoreursis in monastic Christianity, by contrast, features a public demonstration of one's
“obedience and contemplation." To attest their obedience, the monks must expose their selves to
their masters and adjust their behavior completely to the matters’ demand. Foucault refers to
John Cassian and cites an old principle: "everything the monk does without permission of his
master constitutes a theft" (44). This principle exemplifies a behavioral submission to the
external power; and concerning the mental submission, monks are required to make sure their
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thoughts are turning towards God. They must lay aside their own will, and re-constitute their
selves (both in thinking and conduct) by submitting to the command of the external power.
The maxim "know thyself" is given new meanings in early Christian culture, and it serves
a different purpose in this context. Self-examination is turning from a private activity to one that
involves submission to authority, and one introspects oneself closely no longer for the sake of
being the master of oneself but in order to remove oneself from the center of one's concern.

1.4

Development of the Concept in Renaissance and Reformation

During the Renaissance and Reformation, the maxim of "know thyself" continues to engage
theologians and secular writers alike. Erasmus, for instance, talks about the battle between body
and soul and contends that knowing oneself is the first step on the path towards God. According
to Erasmus, self-knowledge is not merely the knowledge about one's sin and lower passions, but
it enables one to maintain an order among the conflicting elements within oneself. Erasmus
writes, "the only road to happiness is first to know yourself and then not to act in anything
according to the passions but in all things according to the judgment of reason" (46). His idea
about the order within oneself and caution against being the slave of one's passion is echoed by
Shakespeare, who in the mouth of Hamlet proclaims: "and blessed are those/ Whose blood and
judgment are so well commingled. […]/Give me that man that is not passion’s slave (3.2.62-5).
Sir Philip Sidney also brings up the importance of knowing oneself. In "An Apology for
Poetry," he relates the knowledge of oneself to both virtue and poetry. For Sidney, all types of
earthly learning, be it philosophy, art, math or astronomy, are merely the "serving science" that
point towards "Architectonike," namely, "Knowledge of a man's self […] ethic and political
condition" (117), while the end of "Architectonike" itself lands in virtue, which is the "ending
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end" and makes possible the perfection of our souls. In between knowledge of oneself and virtue,
poetry serves as the interlink, or as Elizabeth Fowler comments, "an ethical process" (180).
Sidney compares and contrasts the functions of philosophy, history, and poetry, defending
poetry's power to move readers towards virtuous action. But to delight in poetry, Sidney writes,
one should "seek to know what they do, and how they do, and especially, look themselves in an
unflattering glass of reason, if they be inclinable unto it. For Poesy must not be dawn by the ears;
it must be gently led, or rather it must lead" (139). In other words, for Sidney, self-examination is
the starting point for reading poetry, which leads the readers towards virtue and perfection of
their souls.
Even though scholars commonly agree upon the importance of the maxim "knowing
thyself," their opinions diverge regarding how the maxim should be interpreted, or more
specifically, how to know oneself. In Renaissance Self-Fashioning from More to Shakespeare,
Stephen Greenblatt makes two major observations about the conception of the self in the
sixteenth century. On the one hand, Greenblatt argues that a man's understanding of his self is a
story created by himself. Greenblatt calls such process of creating the understanding of oneself
as "self-fashioning," and he writes, "there appears to be an increased self-consciousness about
the fashioning of human identity as a manipulable, artful process" (2). For the self as the object
of fashioning, Greenblatt equates it with that of one's identity, which is further specified as one's
personality, conduct, perception and one's relation with the world. In the Christian context, the
ultimate purpose of such self-fashioning is to model oneself after Christ, while in the secular
setting, adjusting oneself to the "manners of men" is the critical concern.
On the other, Greenblatt observes that there is “less autonomy in self-fashioning in the
sixteenth century than before” (1). Compared to the power of one's own, the power from the
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external source, especially the power of culture, plays a more important role in a person's selffashioning. Greenblatt cites Clifford Geertz that “There is no such thing as a human nature
independent of culture.” And by culture, Greenblatt refers specifically to the “control
mechanical” such as “plans, recipes, rules, instructions” that govern one’s behavior (3). Exposed
to the control mechanism in a given culture, the formation of one's self-understanding is closely
connected to his relation with authority and with the alien, from which he receives both
affirmation and blows of destruction, and during the process of which the way one understands
oneself is formed and reformed.
Such understanding of the self as is shaped by the relation to power is popular among the
theologians but called into question by the skeptics. Even the theologians hold different views
about power and authority. Martin Luther, for instance, challenges the authority of the Pope by
arguing that man's self-knowledge is only connected with the knowledge of God. For Luther,
"faith is the only justification" (Wilcox 295). Since the signs of "grace of faith" are already in
man and define who he is, the primary purpose of knowing oneself is to discover such signs
which alone determine the values of humans' action and promises salvation. Further, due to the
predestined nature of salvation, Luther argues against working for it by physical acts. Instead, the
personal experience of introspective self-searching stands in the core of his thought.
The same as Luther, John Calvin argues that self-knowledge and the knowledge of God
are the two parts of the total sum of the sacred doctrine (Calvin 267). Yet, compared to Luther,
Calvin lays more stress on the reading of the Bible and men's social obligation towards their
neighbors. For Calvin, reading and interpreting the Scripture helps to cultivate self-knowledge
and religious devotion. In The Institutes, Calvin writes,
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Man is never sufficiently touched and affected by the awareness of his lowly state
until he has compared himself with God's majesty. […]We see how Abraham
recognizes more clearly that he is earth and dust (Gen. 18:27) when once he had
come nearer to beholding God's glory; and how Elijah, with uncovered faced,
cannot bear to await his approach, such is the awesomeness of his appearance (I
Kings 19:13). And what can man do, who is rottenness itself (Job 13:28) and a
worm (Job 7:5; Ps. 22:6), when even the very cherubim must veil their faces out
of fear? (Isa. 6:2) (322).

The description of man as earth, dust, rottenness, and worm is not unfamiliar in
Shakespeare's plays, especially in Hamlet and King Lear where the dignity of man is constantly
called into question. For Calvin (and for Shakespeare to some degree), to know oneself is to
realize man's depravity in relation to God, his position in the world as well as the ultimate
purpose to glorify God. In the meanwhile, Calvin insists that remnant of the divine image exists
in every man in spite of man's depravity. The shared self-understanding of men as mirroring
God's image unites human race and places each man under the obligation towards others.
Accordingly, a man's self-knowledge is not only related to the knowledge of God but also
connected to the relation with his neighbors.
On top of the different interpretations of the power relation based upon which selfunderstanding is developed, thinkers during the Renaissance and Reformation hold diverse
opinions towards the role played by reason when a man seeks self-knowledge. Erasmus claims
that by reason, man is able to envision revelation (though partially) in himself. Luther and
Calvin, by contrast, hold a less optimistic attitude towards human's reason than Erasmus. "You
must not consult reason in this point," Luther writes, "but rather trust the Holy Spirit, accepting
what he speaks as the divine truth, and believing in his words, while blinding, yes, even putting
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out the eyes of reason" (Wedel, 124). And Calvin directly deprecates the use of reason to achieve
self-knowledge. Both of these reformers argue that one can obtain self-knowledge only with the
aid of God. The process of knowing oneself, accordingly, is to find the sense of God in oneself
that is beyond reason and already given to man before his birth. Sir James Perrott, by
comparison, holds a more divided opinion towards reason. At the same time arguing that "to
behold (as near as we may) the map and character of human condition," one should look into the
"glass of consideration," which is the "process of reason pertaining to the contemplation of the
truth" (1-2), he admits that with reason alone, one can never obtain the true wisdom, namely,
"the knowledge of things both divine and human: which is the cause that we imitate divine
things, and all human inferior matters are lead by the force thereof" (49).
In the Handbook The First Part of the Consideration of Human Condition, Perrot breaks
the maxim Nosce Teipsum into three parts and discusses part by part how to develop proper selfunderstanding: to know thyself according to "what thou are," "who thou are," and "what manner
of man thou are" (9). Perrott's handbook is useful in the sense that it presents a picture of how the
orthodox Christian humanists understood the conception of the self when Shakespeare wrote his
plays, and it provides a theoretical framework to examine Shakespeare's exploration of the self.

1.5 James Perrot's Framework of Self-Understanding
The first section of the handbook—the consideration of who thou are—presents a dire picture of
mankind. At the same time praising highly man's most excellent help of reason, Perrott depicts
man as "sick of three-fold malady—his birth is unpure, his life perverse, and death dangerous"
(27). By "unpure birth," Perrott refers to man's humble beginning: by creation, man is made of
dust; by generation, he is the descendent of the disobedient first parents, and when man is born to
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the world, he is in the state of nakedness and feebleness. The image of dirt and bare body is
presented by Shakespeare in the character of Poor Tom. In King Lear, the playwright stages the
process of how a man returns to the humble beginning of what he is when stripped of all his
worldly belongings. Yet, for Perrott, this is only one part of the miserable picture of what man is.
Due to its "weak and slender beginning" (11), human life is doomed to be short and full of
miseries; and because by nature man inclines towards vicious acts, there are three degrees of
deaths waiting ahead: natural death, death of offense, and death of judgment.
Perrott further divides the death of judgment into three types. The first judgment one
must face is from one's conscience. This judgment is concerned with a man's death and his
"deserve of death" (24). No one can escape from it, for it keeps reminding each man of the pain
of death and the punishment he shall receive after death. Perrott cites a metaphor by a heathen
philosopher, according to whom a guilty conscience is the "ulcer in the body" (25); it constantly
troubles and grieves a man's mind. In the play Macbeth, Shakespeare shows Macbeth's
conscience at work by staging the ghosts of Duncan and Banquo in front of the audience. The
fear Macbeth experiences is three-fold. It is not only aroused by the judgment of his own
conscience, but also by the judgment of men and judgment from the divine. Perrott discusses in
his handbook that these judgments involve the issue of authority. As the ground of human
existence, the authority of the divine is absolute, and a judgment from the divine brings about the
final demarcation between life and death, either allowing for perpetual joy or sentencing a man
to eternal death. The authority of men, however, remains debatable. Although Perrot admits that
the judgment of men is not always true, he follows the orthodox Christian teaching and argues
for the necessity of submitting oneself to the authority: "It is not lawful to malign magistrates
though they be wicked and evil," Perrott writes. "The reason thereof is, because that they, when
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they do give judgment of life and death, are the substitute of him, who is the author of life and
death" (25-26).
The second part of Perrott’s handbook focuses on the question of who one is. It consists
of four chapters. Each chapter is devoted to a discussion of family lineage, the state, wealth, and
social status. Self-knowledge is not merely relevant to a man's singular self but also to his
relation to other human beings. Perrott comes close to Greenblatt's idea of self-fashioning, and
the understanding of who one is directly affects the way one positions oneself in the world. In
this section, Perrott explores the influence of family, the debate between body and mind, the
virtue of patience, and the danger of envy. These topics can also be found in Shakespeare's
Othello. Although it can not be known whether Shakespeare has acquaintance with Perrott, the
play Othello can be interpreted to some degree as Shakespeare's response to the main issues
raised by Perrot regarding the question of who one is.
The last section of Perrott's handbook—the consideration of the self according to what
manner of man someone is—mainly focuses on the understanding of the mind. During the
Renaissance, as Bacon summarizes, there are two types of knowledge concerning human mind:
"the one respecting his understanding and reason, and the other his will, appetite, and affection"
(Bacon 127). Perrott covers both aspects and breaks his discussion into three parts: learning,
wisdom, and perturbations of mind.
In this section, Perrott contends that the ultimate purpose of learning and knowledge is to
obtain self-knowledge: "the beginning and ending of true knowledge and learning is to know
ourselves... forgetting thy self, thy knowledge and thy learning do little benefit thee." But true
knowledge about oneself is not merely concerned with "the knowledge about human affairs
only" (prudence) but also with the "knowledge about the things divine and humane" (sapience),
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the latter of which, according to Perrott, is the true wisdom. Although at the beginning of The
First Part of the Consideration of Human Condition, Perrott claims that man should understand
his condition through the glass of consideration (reason), in this section of the handbook, he
points out the problematic of human reason, which is uncertain and prone to errors. To obtain the
true wisdom and conquer the perturbations of the mind, Perrott argues for the necessity of three
types of virtue: intellectual, moral and theological (45).
By encouraging his readers to explore with him the three questions about man—"what
thou are," "who thou are" and "what manner of man thou are"—Perrott aims to present a
panoramic picture of a man's self-study. The first question focuses on the epistemological side of
the maxim know thyself, the second question on the social and political, and the third on the
cognitive and theological. When discussing the third question, in particular, Perrott is showing
how to obtain self-knowledge. He first points out the importance of knowing oneself. Then by
examining closely human intellectual capability, natural inclinations and temperament, Perrott
differentiates two types of wisdom about oneself, namely, the wisdom that one can obtain by
reason, and the wisdom for which reason alone is insufficient but is the true wisdom. For the first
time in the handbook, Perrott casts human reason into doubt and brings up the necessity of moral
and theological virtue. The problematic pointed out by Perrott is staged in Shakespeare's plays as
well. In the play Hamlet, Shakespeare deconstructs learning and human reason as the solution to
the existential problem Hamlet faces. If moral and theological virtue is the answer provided by
Perrott, is the answer shared by Shakespeare? Before a detailed analysis about how Shakespeare
explores the maxim know thyself, two more thinkers' opinions about the issue are worth notice.
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1.6

Montaigne's Self-Study

The same as the Renaissance and Reformation thinkers mentioned above, Montaigne lays stress
on the importance of knowing oneself especially in his essays of the later period. His discussion
of the self should be paid attention to because of Shakespeare's acquaintance with Montaigne's
works. Jacob Feis, for instance, writes that "we further hear how Hamlet reasons about the
question as to how 'to be rightly great.' All the thoughts he produces seem to flow from the pen
of the French philosopher [Montaigne]" (104). Herr Stedefeld sees in the character of Hamlet the
image of Montaigne and argues that the play Hamlet is Shakespeare's critical response to
Montaigne skepticism. In the essay "The Relation of Shakespeare to Montaigne," Elizabeth
Robbins Hooker makes a point-by-point comparison between exerts from Shakespeare's plays
and those from Montaigne's essays. She argues that Shakespeare uses the Essays as "store-house
of material" (347) and transforms the materials into his own plays. Stephen Greenblatt in the
introduction of Shakespeare's Montaigne The Florio Translation of the Essays: A Selection talks
about Shakespeare's possible borrowing from Montaigne. At the same time pointing out the gap
between these two writers, Greenblatt lists the similarities in their understanding of human
identity: "both believed that there was a profound link between language and identity, between
what you say and how you say it and what you are, both were fascinated with ethical meanings
in a world that possessed an apparently infinite range of human behaviors. Both perceived and
embraced the oscillations and contradictions within individuals, the equivocations and ironies
and discontinuities even in those who claimed to be single-minded and single-hearted in pursuit
of coherent goals" (xxxii).
The same as Luther and Calvin, Montaigne calls into question human reason and
reflections. In "Apology for Raimond Sebond," Montaigne argues that if the soul is able to know
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anything, its own self should be the first it can know, for it is closer to itself than anything else.
Yet, even for that which one is supposed to be the most familiar with, during the process of selfseeking, what one can find is merely the unreliability of his reason and his ignorance about
himself. "Apology for Raimond Sebond," Montaigne's longest and one of his most famous
essays, is originally designed to defend Raimond Sebond. However, at the same time
acknowledging the necessity of knowing oneself, Montaigne holds a much less optimistic view
towards human capability to obtain self-knowledge than Sebond. According to Montaigne, men
are at a loss concerning what is necessary for them, and they cannot agree on what they need for
their satisfaction. If one cannot even understand oneself, Montaigne questions, then "what can
one understand?" (224)
Because of the unreliability of human reason, Montaigne warns against the presumption
of knowledge, with which one "plunges into the infernal abyss" (157). According to Montaigne,
it is merely human vanity to assume that with reason and reflections, they are superior to
animals. In "Apology," Montaigne writes, "our human reasons and reflections are, as it were, the
lumpish and barren matter. […] Lice are sufficient to make vacant Sulla's dictatorship, and the
heart and life of a great and triumphant emperor is the breakfast of a little worm" (104-125).
Similarly, Shakespeare who creates characters that constantly question the nature of man and
consider themselves no better than insects and animals. Montaigne's claim that man is nothing
but the "breakfast of a little worm" can be compared to Hamlet's speech to Claudius: "We fat all
creatures else to fat us, / and we fat ourselves for maggots. Your fat king and your lean/ beggar is
but variable service—two dishes, but to one table. / That’s the end "(4.3.22-25). And in King
Lear, Lear grasps the "unsophisticated" state of man when he catches sight of pour Tom and
claims:
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Is man no more than
this? Consider him well. Thou owest the worm no silk, the beast
no hide, the sheep no wool, the cat no perfume. Ha! here's
three on's are sophisticated. Thou art the thing itself. Unaccommodated man is no more but such a poor, bare, forked
animal as thou art"
(3.4.95-100)

To the question brought up by Shakespeare (as voiced by Lear) —"Is man no more than
this?" —Montaigne's answer is affirmative. For him, men are neither superior nor inferior to
other animals, but every living being on earth is bound by the same law of nature. Montaigne
writes:

We are neither above nor below the rest. Wretched being, he is really not in a
condition to step over the rail; he is fettered and circumscribed, he is subjected to
a co-ordinate obligation with the other creatures of his class, and of a very humble
condition, without any prerogative or pre-eminence true and real; that which he
attributed to himself, by vain fancy and opinion, had neither body nor taste.
(290-291)

Admittedly, Montaigne agrees that only humans have imagination; yet, he contends that
imagination can only make the mind ill instead of making man any more competent. Montaigne
supports his point by referring to the example of Simonides, whose mind is troubled by all of the
possibilities his imagination suggests to him, and he "despaired of the truth" (335). A similar
idea can be found in Hamlet, when Horatio expresses concern for Hamlet's imagination after
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failing to prevent the latter from approaching the Ghost: "He waxes desperate with imagination"
(1.4.92).
By questioning human's reason, judgment, imagination, sense, and passions, Montaigne
demarcates what man cannot know for sure about himself and what one can know. In "Apology
for Raimond Sebond," it is not possible for men to have a complete grasp of the essence of his
soul, his physical makeup, as well as the relationship between the two; and what one can know
about himself is merely his weakness, ignorance, and vanity. This being so, however, Montaigne
maintains the necessity of knowing oneself. In "Of Presumption," he writes,

I would not, however, for fear of erring on this side, that a man should not know
himself aright, or think himself less than he is.[…] The world always looks
outwards, I bend my gaze inwards; there I fix it, there I keep it occupied.
Everyone looks before him, I look within me, I have no business but with myself,
I am eternally meditating upon myself, examine and testing myself. Other men's
thoughts are ever wandering abroad, if they will but see it; but for my part, I
revolve within myself.
(295-321)

It is from the practice of self-study that one learns the lesson about humility and
obedience. At the end of "An Apology for Raimond Sebond," Montaigne contrasts the unreliable
and ever-changing state of man with God who truly and alone is, and who can transcend the
measure of time. To make a good man, Montaigne contends, "humility and submission alone
have the power" (147). In this regard, Montaigne shares the Christian teaching about Nosce
teipsum, namely, to know oneself is to know one's humble state in position to God.
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On top of man's relation to God, Montaigne examines carefully his relation to other men
and relation to the world. In "Of Husbanding the Will," Montaigne argues that a man who knows
himself should fulfill the duties he owes to others since these duties are inherently implied in his
self-understanding. "He who does not in some manner live for others," Montaigne writes, "hardly
live for himself" (210). In the essay, Montaigne takes care to demarcate what belongs to himself,
what to others, and what are the duties he owes to others so that he can focus on his selfcultivation without being distracted by the extraneous: "Man should lend himself to others, and
give himself only to himself (211). Besides, Montaigne brings up the idea that one owes
friendship to oneself, and a "salutary and well-regulated friendship" (210) entails both knowing
oneself and occupying oneself with the duty one owes to oneself.
With respect to the methods of self-occupation and cultivation, Montaigne discusses
extensively strategies such as examining himself, listening to himself, testing his judgment
against those of the ancients, accepting his folly and vanity, and most importantly, trusting
himself to the law of nature. In "Of Experience," Montaigne writes, "nature has with a motherly
tenderness observed this principle: that the actions she has enjoined for our need should also be
pleasurable to us: and she invites us to them not only through reason but also through appetite. It
is wrong to infringe her laws" (308). Thus, instead of the role of culture in self-fashioning as
Greenblatt points out, it is the role of nature that Montaigne emphasizes. And instead of looking
outside for that which one can fashion oneself, Montaigne argues that one should look within for
the pattern of nature one should follow.
Montaigne lays stress upon the autonomy of self-fashioning, which Stephen Greenblatt
believes was weakened during the sixteenth century. "I would rather understand myself well in
myself," Montaigne writes, "than in Cicero" (273). And at the end of "Of Experience,"
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Montaigne makes a powerful point: "We seek other conditions because we do not understand the
use of our own, and we go out of ourselves because we do not know what there is within us"
(316). Montaigne's practice of writing essays about himself, and showing to others what he has
found within himself resembles the practice of monastic exagoreursis to some degree. Yet, the
exposure is no longer for the sake of demonstrating one's obedience to one's master, but it is one
of the many ways of knowing and cultivating himself. Montaigne makes these two points clearly
in "Of Giving the Lie," where he writes, "in painting myself for others, I have painted myself in
colors clearer than those of my original nature. I have no more made my book than my book
made me: a book consubstantial with its author, with an occupation peculiar to itself, an organic
part of my life" (327).
Montaigne's essays about himself demonstrate both the model of Greco-Roman model of
"care of oneself" and the Christian models of knowing oneself, but different from the teaching of
the latter, for Montaigne, to know himself is to not to renounce himself but to rid himself the
control of the external authority. As Jerome Schwarz argues, although absolute freedom is
impossible, the quest for freedom lies at the center of Montaigne's essays. Only when one is free
from "from the authority of others, from custom, from ideology, even from language, and from
all that conspires to rob us of our authenticity"(155) can one restore the authority of oneself and
fully occupy oneself with oneself.
In "An Apology for Poetry," Sidney argues virtue is the end for mankind, but for
Montaigne, especially in his later essays, the purpose of self-knowledge and self-occupation is to
"enjoy [his] existence as he ought" (316). Montaigne holds doubt about virtue as the ending end
and argues that virtue is the result of "the dislocation which the passions bring about in our
reason" (231). A man cannot have perfect virtue in the eyes of Montaigne, and even the "purest
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virtue" of Plato is contaminated to some degree. Thus, different from Sidney, Montaigne's main
concern is less about chasing after perfect virtue than about accepting oneself including his
weakness and imperfection.

1.7

Bacon's Critique of the Self

While Montaigne considers self-knowledge as one of his primary concerns, Bacon cautions
against too much attention on oneself, and he regards self-knowledge as merely a part of natural
philosophy. In "Of Wisdom for a Man's Self," Bacon calls a man's self "a poor centre" of his
actions, and he compares the wisdom of a man's self to that of rats, foxes, and crocodiles. He
condemns such wisdom as a "depraved thing" (478-9). Moreover, Bacon calls into question the
capability of the human race to find out the truth about itself, arguing that the attempt to work
upon oneself is fruitless. Bacon writes: "For the wit and mind of man, if it work upon matter,
which is the contemplation of the creatures of God, worketh according to the stuff, and is limited
thereby; but if it work upon itself, as the spider worketh his web, then it is endless, and brings
forth indeed cobwebs of learning, admirable for the fineness of thread and work, but of no
substance or profit" (29-30).
Admittedly, in "Of the Advancement of Learning," Bacon calls self-knowledge "the end
and the term of natural philosophy in the intention of man;" yet, he places it under the system of
natural philosophy, and contends that as any particular science, when self-knowledge is separate
from the "common fountain" of natural philosophy, it is to "become barren, shallow, and
erroneous" (112-113).
Bacon divides the study of man into two parts: "man segregate or distributively" and
"man congregate or in society." Different from Montaigne who seeks within himself for self-

21
knowledge, Bacon argues that one should look outside at the "politic glass." Bacon talks about
how men need "to take good information touching their own person, and well to understand
themselves: knowing that, as St. James saith, though men look oft in a glass, yet they do
suddenly forget themselves; wherein as the divine glass is the world of God, so the politic glass
is the state of the world, or times wherein we live, in the which we are to behold ourselves"
(233).
The purpose of self-knowledge, according to Bacon, is for power and control rather than
for the ideal of morality or the dignity of human beings. "My purpose," Bacon writes, "is to try
whether I cannot in very fact lay more firmly the foundations and extend more widely the limits,
of the power and greatness of man" (294). Dominance in the exterior world is deemed more
important by Bacon than interior integrity. The conflict between the route pointing inward (for
salvation, virtue or the contentment of life) and the route aiming outward (for self-expansion and
power) is staged in Shakespeare's tragedies between his tragic heroes and villains (especially the
character of Iago). Bacon's discussion about the self is important not because of how
Shakespeare borrows from it but because of how Shakespeare keeps it in the context and argues
against it.
In the following study, the first three chapters focus on how Shakespeare stages the three
questions raised by James Perrott concerning self-understanding, namely, what one is, who one
is, and what manner of man one is? The main idea of Chapter 2 is to develop the idea that
Macbeth is dominated by fear; however, it is not fear itself but the avoidance of fear and
avoidance of the question about what one is that leads Macbeth towards his self-destruction.
Chapter 3 begins with the discussion of the family structure in Renaissance England, and it offers
a discussion about how the inclination for self-denial under paternal power turns Desdemona into
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a blind wife and Othello into a jealous husband and leads to their tragic marriage. In Chapter 4,
Greimas's discussion of passion is applied to the analysis of Hamlet's perturbation of mind, and it
aims to argue that by forsaking the help of intellectual, moral and theological virtues, Hamlet
fails to restore his self-understanding regarding what manner of man he should be. The last
chapter focuses on the process of Lear's redemption, and it argues that the hope of redeeming
oneself can be found only when one resumes one's responsibility towards others.
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CHAPTER 2. MACBETH: AVOIDANCE OF THE SELF

2.1

The Source of Destruction

The theme of self-loss can be traced in almost all of Shakespeare’s tragedies. As Rolf Soellner
argues, "All Shakespeare's tragedies are in some sense tragedies of self-loss" (327). In each tragedy,
the playwright presents a different aspect of the theme. By piecing these aspects together,
especially the aspects in the four greatest tragedies of Shakespeare—Macbeth, Othello, Hamlet
and Lear—one can get a picture of how the playwright interprets the concept of the self, what are
the different trajectories of self-loss the tragic heroes follow, as well as what are the consequences
waiting for them at the end of the trajectories. In the play Macbeth, the trajectory of self-loss is
foreseen and depicted by Macbeth himself:

My thought, whose murder yet is but fantastical,
Shakes so my single state of man
That function is smothered in surmise,
And nothing is but what is not1.
(1.3.138-141)

If creation is a "progression from that which was not, to that which is" (Perrott,11), then
destruction is a reverse process back to "what is not" (1.3.141). From the thought that shakes his
"single state of man" to the translation of thought of murder to the deed of murder, commentators
have debated for centuries about what leads Macbeth to cross the line and begin his self-destruction.

1

The analysis of the play is based on Shakespeare, William. Macbeth in The Norton Shakespeare. Edited
by Stephen Greenblatt, et al. Second Edition. New York: W. W. Norton &Company. 2008. pp. 25692632.
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Ambition, the persuasion of Lady Macbeth, and the lure of the witches' prediction, all play a role
in pushing Macbeth across his moral boundary. Nevertheless, critics are probing into the inner self
of Macbeth to search for that which lures Macbeth to commit the crime.
Stephen Greenblatt, for instance, considers the nature of evil as the source that tempts
Macbeth to cross "the fatal line from criminal desire to criminal act" (2572), and he cites St.
Augustine and Machiavelli for the definition of evil. According to St. Augustine, "evil in its most
radical form is gratuitous–that is, without an explicable rationale or motivation" (2572), and for
Machiavelli, man's evil nature arises from the unsatisfiable desire. One of the main problems in
the play, Greenblatt suggests, is the "cauldron […] in every one of us" (2577). Soellner, similarly,
argues that Macbeth is "associated from the beginning with a 'bloody execution,'" and he reacts
"emphatically to the suggestion of evil" (339) because he is doomed to perform the evil deed.
Soellner writes, "we cannot help feeling that there is something mysterious, an element that defies
final analysis, in the urge that drives him to kill and kill again, and that his nature has a subhuman
or superhuman stratum that responds powerfully to the suggestion of evil" (332).
Foakes, however, sees the motivation of Macbeth as beyond the moral discussion of good
and evil. The desire of Lady Macbeth is "for the crown," Foakes writes, but that of Macbeth is
"larger, the urge to fulfill himself […] Macbeth has begun as a killer, and his growth and fulfillment
lie in confronting further and more terrible images of death […] Macbeth is a play that escapes
from ordinary moral boundaries and judgments; it is less about a criminal who must be morally
condemned than about a great warrior who breaks through the fear-barrier only to find on the other
side not the release and fulfilment he looks for, but a desert of spiritual desolation" (26-27).
Elmer Edgar Stoll brings up the idea that Shakespeare intentionally omits the motivation
of Macbeth. Stoll writes: "as with Hamlet's feigning of lunacy and Lear's dividing of the kingdom,
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because the motive in the old play not being a good one, it is better that there should be none at
all: but in Macbeth the omission is deliberate and intentional, and the contravention of
psychological probability is so as well" (27). Following the Aristotelian idea of drama, Stoll argues
that the main complication of Macbeth is still "the good man doing the deed of horror" (26).
Although the change within the tragic hero seems improbable, compared to the motivation of the
character, the situation and the emotional effects are more important. As for Macbeth, Stoll asserts,
"it is the deterrents that he dwells upon, not the incentives; it is the spectral bloody dagger that he
sees, not a glittering crown; and it is 'withered murder' that he follows to the chamber, not the call
to sovereign sway and masterdom. In horror, he commits the crime, even as he is to remember it.
There is no satisfaction but only torment in the thought of it" (27).
When Greenblatt and Soellner see Macbeth more in the light of his evil nature, Stoll sees
him as a good man under the sway of the external power. "The conscience in him," Stoll writes,
"before and after, is that of a good man, not that of the man who can do such wickedness...It is
Macbeth himself that considers the 'good damnation', and neither before nor after does he deceive
himself, as the good, turning to wickedness, necessarily do" (27-28). The dualistic debate between
good and evil never loses its appeal among critics, but the main complication of the play is less
about whether Macbeth is a good or evil man than about how Macbeth conducts himself in the
conflict between his evil inclination and good conscience. It is the conflict mankind experiences
in general. In Macbeth, however, it is rendered more intense because of the uncertainties and
equivocation he is thrown into, where both his evil side and the conscientious side have been
amplified. Macbeth's "single state of man" is shaken and he is seized by fear from the beginning
of the play. Yet, it is not the struggle itself nor the fear accompanying it that brings about his
destruction but the character's attempt to escape from the struggle. The issue of self-fulfillment, as
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Foakes asserts, is more complicated than simply selecting one side of oneself (as a killer who tries
to overcome the fear of death) while smothering the other. In this play, Shakespeare stages the
complicated human nature that has been swaying between good and evil, and by showing the
trajectory Macbeth follows towards self-destruction, the playwright is engaging audience with the
question posed by James Perrot in the First Part of the Consideration of Human Condition: how
does man understand himself regarding what he is? and how does man lose himself when he avoids
this question?

2.2 The "Seeds of Time" and the Seed of Evil
First Witch: When shall we three meet again?
In thunder, lightning, or in rain?
Second Witch: When the hurly-burly’s done,
When the battle’s lost and won.
Third Witch: That will be ere the set of sun.
First Witch: Where the place?
Second Witch: Upon the heath.
Third Witch: There to meet with Macbeth.
(1.1.1-7)
The first line of the play spoken by the first witch shows that something unusual is planned
and waiting for Macbeth. The discussion about thunder, lightning, and rain suggests the chaotic
nature of the something, and the equivocation about winning and losing indicates the ambiguous
side of it. The time when the witches are going to meet again is on the verge of darkness. At that
specific time, as predicted by the witches, the battle will be done. But winning and losing are still
woven together: it is not clear who is winning, who is losing, or who is both winning and losing.
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The seeming ending of the battle is not yet the end; instead, it unfolds more uncertainties and the
darkness to come.
When Macbeth first appears on the stage, he is immediately thrown into this swirl of
uncertainties. The sight of the witches remains uncertain: what are they? Are they male or female:
"you should be women, / And yet your beards forbid me to interpret/ That you are so" (1.3. 4345)? Do they really exist or are they merely the fantasy of mind—"what seemed corporal/ Melted
as breath into the wind" (1.3.79-80)? Confronted with the questions about their identities, the
witches never give a reply. The use of the word "what" instead of "who" reveals Macbeth's concern
about the nature of the witches. Yet, what is more ambiguous is the witches' prediction. Although
their prediction later comes true, when it is first given, it only reveals part of the picture about what
will happen. For instance, when the witches foretell the crown, they never detail how to get the
crown nor what the price Macbeth has to pay. Partial truth, on the one hand, can be as deceitful as
a lie, since lured by it, one tends to forget the greater danger hiding behind, just as Banquo cautions:
"The instruments of darkness tell us truths, /Win us with honest trifles, to betray’s/ In deepest
consequence" (1.3.122-124). On the other, however, partial truth leaves Macbeth the freedom to
fill in the rest part of the picture, and it makes room for the working of his conscience.
Hearing the witches' prediction, Macbeth "start[s] and seem[s] to fear" (1.3.49). A different
image of the character is presented from the one depicted in the previous scene. In the eyes of
Duncan, Macbeth is both valiant and worthy; Ross calls him "Bellona's bridegroom" (1.2. 54); and
according to the description of the sergeant, Macbeth is brave and brutal, "distaining fortune"
(1.2.17). However, when Macbeth is faced with the prediction of his future, instead of distaining
it, he turns into a man of fear. As he admits in the soliloquy later in Act One Scene Two, it is the
thought of murder that terrifies him. The line by the witch—"All hail, Macbeth, that shalt be king
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hereafter!" (1.3.48)—is interpreted by Macbeth as a temptation to satisfy his "earnest of success"
(1.3.131), and the temptation is further understood as a suggestion whose horrid images that
unsettle him. When the witches show Macbeth the point (the crown) he is about to arrive at,
Macbeth himself charts the route to the point. The earnest questions Macbeth raises to the witches
demonstrate his strong interest in the witches' prediction: "But how of Cawdor?" (1.3.70), "Say
from whence/ You owe this strange intelligence, or why/ Upon this blasted heath you stop our
way/ With such prophetic greeting" (1.3.73-76). Although he does not get the answers from the
witches and knows that they are "imperfect speakers" (1.3.68), Macbeth is ready to free himself
from scruples after the prediction about Thane of Glamis and Thane of Cawdor comes true. If to
"overcome knowing" is the task of Lear, Hamlet and Othello as Cavell argues, it is not necessarily
the case for Macbeth. On the contrary, it is Macbeth's attempt to resist knowing and avoid his inner
struggle that leads to his self-loss. The seed of evil is already sowed in the mind of Macbeth, as
Foakes puts it, "it seems plain that he has thought of such a possibility before meeting the witches,
or at least that his starting at their greetings of him (I. iii.51) registers his awareness at this moment
that what they say gives conscious expression to a half-formed image" (11).
The witches' prediction, to some degree, does play a role in bringing about the result it
foretells. If without the assurance of the crown from the witches, it is possible that Macbeth may
not cross the line of murder. In the meanwhile, however, Macbeth's active participation is involved
in the process, making it impossible to tell whether the realization of the prediction is the product
of predestination or the result of free will. By rendering the plot in this way, Shakespeare reveals
a much less clear-cut attitude towards prophecy than those of his contemporaries. Francis Bacon,
for instance, makes a strong point that he despises anything related to fortune telling. In the essay
"Of Prophecy," he writes:
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There are numbers of the like kind; especially if you include dreams, and
predictions of astrology. But I have set down these few only of certain credit, for
example. My judgment is, that they ought all to be despised; and ought to serve but
for winter talk by the fireside. Though when I say despised, I mean it as for belief;
for otherwise, the spreading or publishing of them is in no sort to be despised. For
they have done much mischief; and I see many severe laws made to suppress them.
That that hath given them grace, and some credit, consisteth in three things. First,
that men mark when they hit, and never mark when they miss; as they do generally
also of dreams. The second is, that probable conjectures, or obscure traditions,
many times turn themselves into prophecies: while the nature of man, which
coveteth divination, thinks it no peril to foretell that which indeed they do but
collect [...]. The third and last (which is the great one) is, that almost all of them,
being infinite in number, have been impostures, and by idle and crafty brains merely
contrived and feigned after the event past.
(354)

In the discussion, the position of Bacon is clear: prophecy should not be trusted.
Shakespeare, however, bypasses the argument concerning whether Macbeth should or should not
believe in the prediction of the witches. Admittedly, the playwright warns of the danger of
prediction by giving a grotesque appearance to the witches who deliver it. Yet, the nature of "this
supernatural soliciting" (1.3.129) remains uncertain: "it cannot be ill, cannot be good" (1.3.30).
Where Bacon regards prophecy as an imposture, Shakespeare designs it to be an equivocation,
which, with its uncertainties, entices interpretation. The equivocation, as Lucy Gent argues, "is not
so much a major theme in the play, as a number of critics have observed, but the very condition of
the play" (422). Under the condition, that is, when the characters are exposed to the uncertainties
brought about by the prediction, the way they react unveils their inner self and forces them to face
their selves.
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In the case of Macbeth, his interpretation of the prediction unveils his thought of murder.
Some critics attribute the murderous thought to Macbeth's ambition; but more commentators
interpret ambition merely as that which conceals something greater behind. Foakes, for instance,
argues that the crown is what Lady Macbeth desires, not what Macbeth desires, and Stoll points
out that Macbeth "has scarcely a word of ambition beforehand, not a word of the delight in the
power when obtained" (27). In the play, Shakespeare does not explain explicitly where the thought
of murder comes from. It is something already there in Macbeth. As James Perrots writes, "Man
is sicked of a three folde malady; in the beginning, in the middle, and in the ending; that is, in his
birth, in his life, and in his death. For his birth is unpure, his life is perverse, & his death
dangerous.... His life is perverse, because that by nature he is proane to all evill actions" (27). If
equivocation is the first condition of the play, then the seed of evil inside Macbeth is the second.
Macbeth cannot choose whether or not to meet the witches for the first time, nor can he avoid the
evil nature inside him, but still, he can choose how to react to them because of his conscience and
the fear aroused by the conscience that holds him back. Faced with the prediction and the evil side
of himself revealed by the prediction, Macbeth is immediately seized by fear, and his reaction to
fear ultimately decides his choice between good and evil.

2.3 The fear of Macbeth
This supernatural soliciting
Cannot be ill; cannot be good. If ill,
Why hath it given me earnest of success,
Commenting in a truth? I am Thane of Cawdor.
If good, why do I yield to that suggestion
Whose horrid image doth unfix my hair
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And make my seated heart knock at my ribs
Are less than horrible imaginings.
(1.3.13-38)
Macbeth is dominated by his fear throughout the play. He utters the word "fears" thirteen
times, and when Macbeth does not directly use the word "fear," he constantly talks about the
impact fear leaves on him. Two questions arise concerning Macbeth's fear: what are the "horrible
imaginings" that he fears? How does fear affect Macbeth's behavior and his self-understanding?
Concerning the first question about fear, Lily B. Campbell argues that it is Macbeth's "fantasy and
imagination of evil approaching" that causes fear; P. Rama Moorthy, however, contends that
Macbeth fears death. But Soellner points out the ambiguous nature of Macbeth's fear, and he writes:

Macbeth in his speech does not make clear to himself and to us what he really fears,
whether it is the possibility of failing and with it the punishment of worldly justice,
or, in spite of success, the punishment of God. The logic of the argument, such as
it is, favors the former interpretation; some of the terms and image, it is true, the
latter (344).

Each of these critics touches upon one or two aspects of Macbeth's fear. I shall argue that
the "horrible imaginings" (1.3.38) of Macbeth include the imagining of damnation both from the
interior and from the exterior. As the character's self-understanding deepens, his understanding of
fear changes. Throughout the play, Macbeth is suffering from three-fold fear, corresponding to the
three degrees of death in Perrott's discussion of what man is: the natural death, the criminal death,
and the judicial death.
The first degree of death is the natural death, or "dissolution of nature" (Perrott 22). In front
of this type of death, two images of Macbeth are shown: Macbeth the valiant and the Macbeth who
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is full of fear. When Macbeth can be fearless towards death on the battlefield, he rips his enemy
open "from the nave to th'chops/ And fixed his head upon our battlements" (1.2.22-23), the thought
of the dead body of Duncan appalls him both when Macbeth is planning the murder and after he
commits the crime:

I’ll go no more:
I am afraid to think what I have done;
Look on ’t again I dare not.
(2.2.48-49)

Foakes points out that the killing on the battlefield is "unpremeditated," while the murder
of Duncan requires planning, which "makes him 'afeard', and brings a new strain to bear on the
courage and imagination of 'brave Macbeth'" (15). In the process of interpreting the witches'
prediction, planning the murder, and debating upon the consequences, Macbeth is forced to ponder
the nature of killing: when he kills as defender of the country on the battlefield, he kills as a traitor
in his own castle. Against Duncan, Macbeth admits, his betrayal is two-fold: he is not only the host
of Duncan but also the subject and kinsman of the virtuous king. What makes Macbeth's betrayal
more horrendous is his plan of murdering Duncan in sleep. Peaceful sleep indicates the state of
complete trust in security, and murdering someone in sleep is to betray such trust. The more
Duncan trusts Macbeth's loyalty, the more heinous Macbeth's betrayal becomes. Besides trust,
sleep also indicates the state of defenselessness. In A Treatise of Human Nature, David Hume
provides a precise analysis of the murder of a person in sleep:

'Tis an aggravation of a murder, that 'twas committed upon persons asleep and in
perfect security; as historians readily observe of any infant prince who is captive in
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the hands of his enemies, that he is the more worthy of compassion the less sensible
he is of his condition. As we ourselves are here acquainted with the wretched
situation of the person, it gives us a lively idea a sensation of sorrow, which is the
passion that generally attends it; and this idea becomes still more lively, and the
sensation more violent by a contrast with that security and indifference which we
observe in the person himself (371).

The sleeping Duncan is no less fragile and innocent than the infant prince in Hume's
discussion, and the compassion his death will provoke is no less intense. The image of the "naked
new-born babe" (1.7.21) appears in Macbeth's imagining. The fragile aspect of such image forms
a stark contrast with the blast it is able to strike, and the innocent aspect of it sets a foil to the
brutality of Macbeth's crime. The imagination of the death of Duncan appalls Macbeth because in
it Macbeth sees not merely the dissolution of nature but also his own criminal death (or the
"approaching evil" in Campbell's words).
The criminal death, also referred to as "death of offence" or "offence itself" is the second
degree of death that defines what man is. It "ought [...] most of all to be feared," Perrott writes, for
it brings about "shame, horror and confusion" that tortures men. Further, the criminal death entails
the coming of the last degree of death—"judicial death" (24). By "judicial," Perrot refers to the
three judgments men have to face concerning his death: the judgment of oneself, the judgment of
men and the divine judgment. In the case of Macbeth, before his natural death he is already
suffering from the judicial death that frightens him.
The first judgment Macbeth faces is the judgment from himself. When Macbeth is planning
the murder, he is constantly evaluating his behavior and the motivation behind his behavior: he
calls his desire black, his face mendacious and his heart evil. The word "false" in the line "false
face must hide what the false heart doth know" (1.7.81-82) has double-meaning. The "false" in the
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"false face," on the one hand, designates "pretending," and it indicates the first change in Macbeth:
from a non-actor to an actor. Hearing the witches' prediction, Macbeth reacts with forthright fear
and raptness in front of Banquo, and in Act One Scene Five, Lady Macbeth compares the face of
Macbeth to a book "where men may read strange matters (1.5.60-61); yet, in Scene Seven of the
same act, Macbeth makes up his mind for the "false face," which foreshadows his later
understanding of life as the life of a player. The "false" in "the false heart," however, refers to
being villainous. The use of this word presupposes that Macbeth has a clear understanding about
what is right and what is wrong. Such understanding, together with the equivocal nature of the
witches' prediction, leaves Macbeth the freedom of choice and makes possible the working of one's
conscience.
Conscience, according to the etymology of the word, is "a knowing with" (Stoll 133)
oneself. It is always there as a witness to man's behavior. In Studies in Words, C. S. Lewis writes,

A person cannot help thinking and speaking of himself as, and even feeling himself
to be

(for certain purposes), two people, one of whom can act upon and observe

the other. Thus, he pities, loves, admires, hates, despises, rebukes, comforts,
examines, masters or is mastered by, 'himself'. Above all he can be to himself in
the relation I have called consciring. He is privy to his own acts, is his own conscius
or accomplice. And of course this shadowy inner accomplice has all the same
properties as an external one; he too is a witness against you, a potential blackmailer,
one who inflicts shame and fear (187).

In Macbeth, the "two people" inside him are symbolized as his eyes and hands. In
"Integrity in Macbeth: The Search for the 'Single State of Man'," Richard Horwich talks about the
"disjunction" in Macbeth: he is "not merely fragmenting but willfully polarizing his character,
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setting his hand and his eye in conflict with each other. These organs, respectively, represent the
outer and the inner man–the active, worldly, logical component of his personality, and the ethical
and emotional sensibilities that are diametrically opposed to it" (368). Yet, the dichotomy the
hands and eyes represent is less between the outer and the inner (for it is difficult to tell which is
inner and which is outer) than between the evil and the conscientious side of the character. If the
hands stand for the evil part, then his eyes represent his conscience that keeps watching him and
his "blooded witnesses" (2.1.48). Macbeth cries out:

Come, seeling night,
Scarf up the tender eye of pitiful day
And with thy bloody and invisible hand
Cancel and tear to pieces that great bond
Which keeps me pale.
(3.2.47-51)

On top of using "bloody and invisible" (3.2.49) for the hand, and "tender" (3.2.48) for the
eyes, Macbeth associates the hand to the night and eyes to the "pitiful day" (3.2.48), under whose
watch, the fear of Macbeth gradually builds up in the play. When Macbeth is brooding over his
murderous plan, he is troubled by the feeling of being seen by the light. Macbeth whispers:

Let not light see my black and deep desires.
The eye wink at the hand, yet let that be
Which the eye fears, when it is done, to see.
(1.4.51-53)
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Light is that which enables seeing. By mentioning the light that sees, Macbeth is referring
not to the light of the natural world but to his conscience that is represented by the light. By these
lines, Macbeth assumes that when the eyes of conscience see no more the evil deed conducted by
his hands, he can rid himself of the fear that weakens him and impedes his action. But even though
he can close his physical eyes, he is unable to close the eyes of his conscience, which forces him
to keep seeing.
Right before he murders Duncan, Macbeth encounters his evil self, which appears to the
eyes of his conscience in the image of a dagger. Macbeth refers to the dichotomy between hands
and eyes (seeing) again in the conversation with himself. Tempted by the dagger with its handle
towards his hand, Macbeth is ready to connect these two together: "Come, let me clutch thee"
(2.2.34). Although he does not directly mention his eyes, from line 35-45, Macbeth repeats in
every five lines: "I see thee still" (2.1.35), "I see thee yet" (2.1.40), "I see thee still" (2.1.45). He is
unable to stop seeing; and in the process Macbeth sees the dagger (addressing it directly in second
person), interpreting its signification, he is forced to examine himself and pre-experience his
"blooded business" (2.1.48). Observing the movement of the dagger, Macbeth is brought face-toface to the intention of his mind—"Thou marshall’st me the way that I was going, and such an
instrument I was to use" (2.1.42-43). Seeing the blood on the handle of the dagger, Macbeth is previewing the consequence before taking the action. Macbeth is both the subject and object of seeing:
he is seeing himself. He can neither stop seeing nor avoid the sense of being seen.
When Macbeth sets off to commit the murder, he is stirred by the sense that he is not alone.
"Who's there? What ho?" (2.2.8). This line both demonstrates his highly agitated mind and his fear
of being heard or seen. Such sense is getting more troubling when he is committing the crime of
murder. As Macbeth later tells his wife, when one of the attendants cries out "God bless us" and
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the other "Amen" in their sleep, they leave Macbeth with the feeling that they "had seen me with
these hangman's hands" (2.2.25). When he returns to the chamber, and asks: "I have done the deed.
Didst you not hear a noise?" (2.2.14), revealing the feeling that he is not alone during the whole
process.
Besides being a witness to his own deeds, Macbeth's conscience judges him and punishes
him by taking away his inner peace and plunging him into deeper fear:

Methought I heard a voice cry, “Sleep no more!
Macbeth does murder sleep”—the innocent sleep,
Sleep that knits up the raveled sleave of care,
The death of each day’s life, sore labor’s bath,
Balm of hurt minds, great nature’s second course,
Chief nourisher in life’s feast—
[...]
Still it cried, “Sleep no more!” to all the house.
“Glamis hath murdered sleep, and therefore Cawdor
Shall sleep no more. Macbeth shall sleep no more.”
(2.2.33-41)

Macbeth repeats the lines–"sleep no more" three times, just as he utters the lines–"I see
thee" three times in the previous scene. Macbeth is unable to stop seeing, and now he is also unable
to stop hearing the voice that is continuously pestering him and taking away his peace of mind.
When the sleep of Duncan in the first act indicates trust and the sense of security, that Macbeth is
unable to sleep shows the loss of both of them. It is ironical that when Macbeth talks about the
deceased Duncan and his plan to murder Banquo, he uses the terms related to sleep: "Duncan is in
his grave. After life’s fitful fever he sleeps well" (3.2.24-25); "The shard-borne beetle with his
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drowsy hums/ Hath rung night’s yawning peal" (3.2.43-44). When Macbeth takes away the lives
of Duncan and Banquo, his loses to them his own sleep. Insomnia describes the state that he is
unable to stop seeing and thus unable to stop fearing. If death for Duncan and Banquo is a kind of
rest, then the state of fear and restlessness Macbeth is experiencing is something even worse than
death.
Besides fearing the judgment from himself by his conscience or by what his conscience
shows and sais to him, Macbeth is troubled by the thought of the divine judgment and the judgment
of men.
If the assassination
Could trammel up the consequence, and catch
With his surcease success; that but this blow
Might be the be-all and the end-all here,
But here, upon this bank and shoal of time,
We’d jump the life to come.
(1.7.2-7)

The word "but" in the line "that but this blow might be the be-all and the end-all here"
(1.7.5) shows Macbeth's awareness of the immensity of his crime: if other things can end in this
world, his murder alone would not simply end here. When he talks about his deeds "upon this bank
and shoal of time" (1.7.6), he is hinting at the existence of the other bank where the divine judgment
on his deeds is waiting for him. By saying "jump thislife to come" (1.7.7), Macbeth concerns
himself with the sentence of his eternal death. "This last degree of death, or difference betweene
life and death," as Perrott writes, "hath in it either much feare or much joy: feare to the wicked in
respect of former offences, but joy unto the faithfull in their hope of enjoying future happinesse"
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(26). However, instead of probing deeper the possible punishment from the divine judgment,
Macbeth switches his attention to a more immediate judgment:

But in these cases
We still have judgment here, that we but teach
Bloody instructions, which, being taught, return
To plague th' inventor: this even-handed justice
Commends the ingredients of our poisoned chalice
To our own lips.
[...]
Besides, this Duncan
Hath borne his faculties so meek, hath been
So clear in his great office, that his virtues
Will plead like angels, trumpet-tongued, against
The deep damnation of his taking-off;
And pity, like a naked newborn babe,
Striding the blast, or heaven’s cherubim, horsed
Upon the sightless couriers of the air,
Shall blow the horrid deed in every eye,
That tears shall drown the wind.
(1.7.7-25)

By "judgment here" (1.7.8), Macbeth is referring to the judgment of men, or worldly
justice, towards which, his fear is two-fold. On the one hand, Macbeth fears to lose the good
judgment on him from others–"golden opinions from all sorts of people, which would be worn
now in their newest gloss, not cast aside so soon" (1.7.32-34); on the other, he fears the
consequence when people judge against him. In his imagining, Macbeth envisions the pity
Duncan's death will provoke and the damnation he is likely to face. The detailed depiction of the
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emotional power of the pity not only sets a foil to the brutality of his crime but also entails the
depth of his damnation. The image of the eyes appears again in his imagination, together with the
horror of being watched. But this time, it is not only the eyes of his conscience that are seeing
but also "every eye." Admittedly, the world of Macbeth is full of uncertainties, but it is by no
means the "groundless world" that Cavell asserts (3). Macbeth's fear that his crime will be
revealed and his "bloody instructions" (1.7.9) will ultimately be returned to him reveals
Macbeth's belief in the existence of the "even-handed justice" (1.7.10), and "one of Macduff's
roles" as Richard Horwich argues, "is to exemplify a disinterested concern for justice" (366).
In act five, scene three, when Macbeth is waiting for the judgment from men—the
approach of the army led by Malcolm and Macduff, he mentions "fear" (and "afraid") six times,
and tries to assure himself that he "cannot," "shall never, and "will not" be fearful. Yet, the more
Macbeth strives to calm himself down, the more he is swayed by fear, and the sight of the
frightened people around him further agitates him and drives him mad. On top of the fear of his
criminal death (the death of offence), his judicial death, Macbeth is now experiencing the fear
brought by the approach of his natural death.

2.4

Avoidance of Fear and Avoidance of Self

Both Moorthy and Soellner consider fear as the main reason for Macbeth's self-loss, and Greenblatt
sees fear as "a dread that threatens inward decomposition" (2573). However, I shall argue that it is
not fear itself but the avoidance of fear that leads to Macbeth's self-destruction. Fear is not
necessarily an imagination of the evil's approach but it can also be an imagination that warns
against one's offence and foretells the coming of the justice. Avoiding fear is to avoid facing the
conscientious side of oneself. Each temporary success over fear plunges Macbeth into deeper
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damnation, and every time Macbeth assumes that he has successfully avoided fear, he is
immediately overwhelmed by stronger fear.
Faced with the uncertainties brought about by the witches' prediction, Macbeth is
struggling between his evil desire and the fear that prevents him from satisfying his desire:
"function is smothered in surmise, and nothing is but what is not" (1.3.140-141). Macbeth has
the freedom of choice, and twice has he tried to give up the thought of murder. However, it is
Lady Macbeth's persuasion that gives him the false hope to end the struggle.

What beast was ’t, then
That made you break this enterprise to me?
When you durst do it, then you were a man;
And to be more than what you were, you would
Be so much more the man.
(1.7.47-49)

Challenging Macbeth's identity of being a man, Lady Macbeth switches Macbeth's
attention from the concern of good and evil to the concern of valor and cowardice. When the first
concern prevents Macbeth from being the same in desire and in deeds, the second one instigates
him to commit the murder. In her persuasion, Lady Macbeth liberates Macbeth from the fear of
judgments (though only temporarily) by reasoning that she and Macbeth can control the judgment
of men by the exertion of power, and they are able to avoid the fear of self-judgment and divine
judgment simply by not thinking. To some degree, Lady Macbeth is taking the similar approach
as the witches and Hecate: all of them are alluring Macbeth away from the consideration of the
judgment that defines what he is as a human and fueling his evil desire.
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Before he sets off to murder Duncan, Macbeth sees his evil self in the image of a dagger,
and describes his brain as "heat-oppressèd" (2.1.39). The conscience of Macbeth is saving him by
forcing him to see and throwing him into fear, while heat fueled by the false hope that he can
escape from being "scanned" by conscience stimulates him to satisfy his desire. Admittedly, heat
is considered the most positive of the four humors. "It was the force within the body that could
most easily change one kind of fluid into another, and it rose naturally toward the heavens and
towards the brain" (Wiesner, 32). Yet, the word "oppressèd" in Macbeth's line signifies the excess
of the heat, which throws him into the danger described by Perrott in The First Part of the
Consideration of Humane Condition: "As an unreasonable year doth either parch the leaves of
tress by reason of excessive heat and drought so that they wither and fall away, or by extreme
colde are consumed, or by blustering storms are blowen of: so doth any extraordinary
distempreature wither of heat or colde, dryness or moisture destroy, or at the least indaunger the
life of man" (14). The image of withered leaves is later echoed in Macbeth's soliloquy when he is
sick at hearing the reports that foretell the coming of his natural death: "I have lived long enough.
My way of life is fall'n into the sere, the yellow leaf" (5.3. 23-24).
However, at the moment he possesses excess heat, Macbeth pushes the consideration of
consequences and cuts the conversation with himself abruptly. The line "words to the heat of deeds
too cold breath gives" shows his awareness that the longer he talks and rationalizes with himself,
the more likely he will be overwhelmed again by his fear. Yet, refusing the fear, Macbeth is
actually refusing himself. The end of the conversation in the dagger scene signals that his self starts
to fall apart:
What hands are here? Ha! They pluck out mine eyes.
Will all great Neptune’s ocean wash this blood
Clean from my hand? No, this my hand will rather
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The multitudinous seas incarnadine,
Making the green one red.
(2.2.57-61)

By these lines, Macbeth is talking about his hands as if the hands do not belong to him but
have their own will to do what they want. The idea of plucking out the eyes with one's own hands
together with the part about fortune-telling echoes Oedipus, and it is possible that Shakespeare
writes Macbeth with Oedipus the King in context but intentionally keeps a distance from it. In the
case of Oedipus, he commits a crime unknowingly, while for Macbeth, he ponders the evil nature
and the consequences of murder thoroughly before committing the crimes. Oedipus plucks out his
eyes as a self-punishment for not seeing; Macbeth, on the contrary, is trying to avoid seeing when
he cries out the line—"they pluck out mine eyes" (2.2.71). Moorthy argues that "Macbeth cannot
pluck out his eyes like a sinner who has seen his sin, for unlike Oedipus he is not there in the sin"
(163). Yet, the line by Macbeth—"I have done the deed" (2.2.14)— proves the opposite. As
Greenblatt puts it, "Macbeth is fully aware of the wickedness of his deeds and is tormented by this
awareness" (2571). Robert B. Heilman shares Greenblatt's idea that Macbeth knowingly commits
the crimes and pushes the point further: the main problem Macbeth has to deal with is "to escape
what he knows" (91). To free himself from the self-torture, Macbeth chooses to avoid seeing and
convinces himself of his innocence. Yet, in doing so, Macbeth's inner self further splits itself.

Still it cried, “Sleep no more!” to all the house.
“Glamis hath murdered sleep, and therefore Cawdor
Shall sleep no more. Macbeth shall sleep no more.”
(2.2.39-41)

44
Macbeth now sees himself in three persons: Glamis, Cawdor and Macbeth. The evil part
of him has done the deed and the other parts suffer because of it. At the beginning of Act Two
Scene Two, Macbeth admits that he has murdered Duncan, but at the end of the same scene, he
intentionally separates the evil deed from his self-understanding: "To know my deed, 'twere best
not know myself" (2.2.71). In the essay "Macbeth and the Politics of Rapture," Christopher Pye
lists different interpretations of this line. In the Riverside gloss, it is rephrased as "if I am to
come to terms with what I have done, I shall need to avoid self-scrutiny?" or "if not being lost in
my thoughts means seeing clearly what I have done, I'd better remain lost in my thoughts ?"
According to Clarendon's version, the line is interpreted as: "If I must look my deed in the face,
it were better for me to lose consciousness altogether." Wilson understands the line as: "Better be
lost in thought than look my deed in the face;" and according to Muir's interpretation: "It were
better for me to remain permanently 'lost in thought, i.e. self-alienated, than to be fully conscious
of the nature of my deed," and Pye himself adds that "the line suggests that in a radical sense the
crime is indistinguishable from its disavowal—that that is the sole condition of its appearance
(136). Despite the nuances between the interpretations, all of them point out Macbeth's gradual
departure from himself by denying the crime he commits. In the banquet scene, when Macbeth
faces the ghosts of Banquo in imagination, he directly refuses his own crime:

(to GHOST) Thou canst not say I did it. Never shake
Thy gory locks at me.
(3.4.49-50)

By crying out "never shake thy gory locks at me" (3.4.49-50), Macbeth is trying to avoid
seeing the result of his heinous command and avoid being looked at. But he is successful in
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doing neither. On the contrary, the more he struggles to stop seeing, the more he is drawn to the
horrible image. Macbeth is forced into the position that he has to stand face-to-face with the
ghost and look into the sight-less eyes that are staring back at him. Macbeth knows immediately:
the Ghost of Banquo is merely "unreal mock'ry" (3.4.106), but despite what he knows, his mind
never stops working against his desire to avoid seeing. Macbeth's fear of "being seen" reaches
its extreme in the scene with the ghost, and he admits to his wife:

My strange and self-abuse
Is the initiate fear that wants hard use.
(3.4.140)

Macbeth attributes the loss of self-control to fear, and to fight against his fear, he adopts
the advice of his wife, namely, to stop thinking about his behavior: "Strange things I have in
head that will to hand,/ Which must be acted ere they may be scanned" (3.4.139-140). However,
it is not his fear but the lack of fear that brings about his destruction. This is proved by Hecate's
strategy to destroy Macbeth: to let him forget his fear and be proud and reckless.

Second Apparition: Be bloody, bold, and resolute. Laugh to scorn
The power of man, for none of woman born
Shall harm Macbeth.
[...]
Third Apparition: Be lion-mettled, proud, and take no care
Who chafes, who frets, or where conspirers are.
Macbeth shall never vanquished be until
Great Birnam Wood to high Dunsinane Hill
Shall come against him. (4.1.95-109)
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Following the instructions of the apparitions, Macbeth speeds to his destruction.
Whispering to himself, Macbeth mentions again his hand and his eyes (though indirectly)—
"From this moment/ The very firstlings of my heart shall be/ The firstlings of my hand" (4.1.162164), "no more sights!" (4.1.171)—and expresses his intention to forego seeing before action.
The line "no more sights" echoes to the line that Macbeth uses to describe the ghost of Banquo:
"Thou hast no speculation in those eyes" (3.4.93). Macbeth is getting nearer and nearer to his
own ghostly state.

2.5

Losing The Meaning of Life
Had I but died an hour before this chance,
I had lived a blessèd time, for from this instant
There’s nothing serious in mortality.
All is but toys. Renown and grace is dead.
The wine of life is drawn, and the mere lees
Is left this vault to brag of.
(2.3.87-92)
Macbeth is acting hypocritically when he utters these lines; yet, ironically, they turn out to

be the true depiction of his life. Immediately after Macbeth murders Duncan, he finds sees his
connection with God broken, and he is no longer able to say "Amen." Although he is later crowned
as king, he never enjoys the security of being king. He loses the trust of people around him and
everything he finds important in life: inner peace, and "honor, love, obedience, troops of friends"
(5.3.25). Without them, life loses meanings, days turning to dreadfulness. And the crown becomes
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a signifier without a signified for Macbeth. Hearing the death of his wife, Macbeth sinks into the
state of desperation. He murmurs:

Tomorrow, and tomorrow, and tomorrow,
Creeps in this petty pace from day to day
To the last syllable of recorded time,
And all our yesterdays have lighted fools
The way to dusty death. Out, out, brief candle!
Life’s but a walking shadow, a poor player
That struts and frets his hour upon the stage
And then is heard no more. It is a tale
Told by an idiot, full of sound and fury,
Signifying nothing.
(5.5.18-27)

The repetition of "tomorrow" in the first line creates a monotonous and barren image of
Macbeth's life. For Macbeth, light and glory only belong to the past, while life he is leading only
heads towards the darkness of future, slowly but steadily, with all of the tortures and sufferance in
between. The word "fury" in the line "told by an idiot, full of sound and fury" (5.5.26) is best
explained in Antony and Cleopatra:

To be furious,
Is to be freighted out of fear; and in that mood
The dove will peck the estridge.
(3.13.197-199)
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With "fury," Macbeth is betraying the fear behind his rage. He describes his life as being
in the darkness of fear, where there is no sight but only sounds and terror that envelop him and
agitate him. Macbeth imagines his life to be a player in the show of darkness, with no face and no
name. And the image of player on the stage appears again in Macduff's threat:

Then yield thee, coward,
And live to be the show and gaze o' th' time.
We’ll have thee, as our rarer monsters are,
Painted on a pole, and underwrit,
'Here may you see the tyrant.'
(5.10.23-27)

As a "walking shadow," Macbeth manages to stop facing himself, but Macduff threatens
to make his image clear again: a monster-like tyrant. If the life in darkness is still bearable to him,
then the fear that he will be exposed to light and gaze again finally provokes him to change his
mind from "I'll not fight with thee" (5.10.22) to "I will not yield" (5.10.27).
In the play, Shakespeare stages the picture of what man is as depicted by Sir. James Perrott.
Though the part about man's humble beginning, the play stages the treacherous path man is prone
to lead, the dangerous death that is waiting upon him, and the consequences when one refuses to
think about the nature of "what man is" and thus loses oneself. Richard Horwich sees Macbeth as
a man "searching for psychic relief in whatever form avails itself to him" and his behavior is "that
of an absolutist, a man for whom no compromises, accommodations, or half-measures are
possible" (369). Yet, in the play, it is Macbeth's inability to be an absolutist that tortures him and
makes him a tragic hero instead of an absolute villain. Seized by his fear, the more he tries to get
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away from, the deeper he sinks in it, and during the process of which, he gradually loses sight of
himself, and turns into a "walking shadow."
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CHAPTER 3. OTHELLO: DENIAL OF THE SELF

3.1 The Family Structure in Renaissance England
In Othello, a tragic marriage was staged between a "blind" wife and a jealous husband who
cannot be deaf to the informer's murmuring about his wife's infidelity. The question about how
Othello gets ensnared by the lies of Iago raises debates among critics. James P. Driscoll, for
instance, points out the split in Othello's co-identity that has been manipulated by Iago and
brings about the disastrous consequence. Edward Berry, similarly, contends that Othello has
been swaying between his identity as an exotic Venetian and the identity as a barbarian. It is "his
failure to break free of this constricting framework, to achieve a true sense of personal identity"
that makes him credulous to Iago's lies. Michael Neil and James L. Calderwood focus on
Othello's stress about being a stranger/outsider and his reliance on Iago as someone "in the
know" (Calderwood 301), who unveils to him "the terrible vertiginous possibility of hidden
depth in himself (Neil 159). Rolf Soellner, Stephen Greenblatt and René Girard bring up the
affinity between Othello and Iago as that which plunges Othello into the control of Iago, though
they hold different ideas about what the affinity is. Soellner argues that "Othello is almost as
conspicuously shown deficient in humility of mind as is Iago"; besides, like Iago, Othello has a
"penchant for self-dramatizations" (273). Girard, however, interprets Iago as "Othello's mimetic
double and therefore so close to him at times that the two men become each other's mirror
image" (292). Greenblatt holds that the "structural resemblance" is the reason why Othello
should submit to Iago's "narrative fashioning" (237). According to Greenblatt, Iago "reproduces
in himself the same psychic structure" as Othello, who equates sexual pleasure with defilement,
and Iago develops the similar "anxiety about his own sexuality" (251). In my view, it is the
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tendency of self-negation of Othello that makes him an easy prey to Iago's maneuver. It is also
the tendency that is shared by Desdemona. Self-negation turns Desdemona to a "blind" wife and
Othello to a jealous husband. It comes from the problematic self-understanding of who one is,
and becomes the source of tragic consequence in this play.
The self-knowledge regarding who one is, Sir James Perrot writes, consists in "the
remembrance and reknowledgement of parentage, linage, and descent; the knowledge of thy state
of body, of thy wealth, calling dignity and wisdom" (28). Although Perrott focuses on the fatherson relation when he talks about parentage, his discussion leads to an important topic: how one
understands oneself in relation to his/her family.
Father-children relationship is an important theme that has been explored frequently in
Shakespeare’s plays. In the Elizabethan England, parents, especially fathers, serve as the
“fundamental preserver of public order and private morality” (Greaves 275), and have high
authority over their children. Both the Tudor Dynasty and the reign of King James call for the
“reinforcement of the patriarchal principle” (Singh1). Against such background, the image of
father and that of the king are connected with each other. Fathers serve as the representative of
the royal power in each household. King James writes, “children could not rise against their
fathers even when their fathers’ acts were wicked or foolish, so subjects could not rebel against
their rulers” (3). The king is described as the father figure to his subjects, who should carry out
their filial duties for the king. The obsession with the analogy between king and father leads to
the absolute authority of fathers in their households. At the same time, fathers are required by the
social norms to take up responsibilities towards their families.
The main responsibilities of the parents include furnishing moderate food, apparel and
inheritance for their children, “keeping [them] from idleness” (Greaves, 276), and providing them
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with professional and religious education either by fathers themselves or by hiring tutors. Fathers’
religious duty, in particular, reinforces their authority as the head of the family. Besides being the
“intermediar[y] between the Central Government and their own servants and dependants,” fathers
are also looked upon as the intermediary between “the latter and God” (Singh, 7). Accordingly, on
top of inculcating in their children the importance of obedience and conformity, fathers are
expected to behave properly and set a good example. Another important responsibility of father is
to “help their progeny find the suitable spouse” (Greaves, 278). It is worth noticing that Greaves
uses the word “help” to describe such duty, for the roles played by fathers in deciding their
children’s spouses can vary from being merely a consultant to making decision for their children
single-handedly.
The primal responsibility of children towards their fathers, according to the mainstream
culture in the Elizabethan England, involves respect and obedience. In Catechism, for instance
Alexander Nowell writes, “it is the duty of children to frame their life according to the will of
their father” (196). In addition, Tudor religious groups are unanimous with children’s duty to
take care of and provide for their parents when the latter are in need.
The understanding the role played by fathers in the family as well as the social norms about
how children should behave is essential for the analysis of the father-child relationship in Othello,
especially in the examination of how fathers affect their children's behavior and shape their selfunderstanding.

3.2

The Father-Daughter Relationship in Othello

One of the typical father-children relationships in Shakespeare’s plays is that between single father
and his adolescent daughter on the verge of womanhood. In this type of relationship, the father is
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the sole influence on daughter’s self-formation within a family, and the daughter’s marriage is the
major concern for both father and daughter. Although it is commonly agreed that the Elizabethan
children have to demonstrate their filial awe by obeying their parents’ decision, some conduct
books offer a more flexible approach. For instance, G. G. Harrison cites a debate between Tychicus
and Philogus, in which Philogus argues that “If parents impose upon their children a match more
to content their desire for more than their children’s godly choice for love then they should not be
obeyed” (Harrison 93). Keith Thomas points out that “‘the actual independence of the wives and
daughters’ was ‘always greater than theory allowed’” (Greaves 8), and he contends that
Shakespeare keeps a distance from the moralistic approach, cites Greaves (57). The criticism on
the conventional marriage decided by fathers indicates the waning parental authority and the rising
of individualism, especially in the late sixteenth and beginning of seventeenth country. Signh
contends that Shakespeare restores familiarly solidarity in his plays not by paternal authority but
by restoring “the affection between parents and children” (57). Yet, in Othello, this kind of
restoration is still missing.
In the opening act of Othello, the major tension is built between an angry father, a
seemingly rebellious daughter, and the Moor she elopes with. In the eyes of Brabanzio, his
daughter is his possession, and such opinion is shared by other male characters in Othello. For
instance, in act one scene one, Roderigo yells: “awake! What, ho, Brabanzio! Thieves! Thieves! /
Look to your house, your daughter, and your bags./ Thieves! thieves!” (1.1.79-81), treating
Desdemona the same as bags in Brabanzio’s household. The status of Desdemona confirms
Brabanzio's absolute power and authority in the family. In act one scene two, the paternal power
of Brabanzio is made clear in Iago’s conversation with Othello:
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He will divorce you,
Or put upon you what restraint and grievance
The law (with all his might to enforce it on)
Will give him cable.2
(1.2.14-17)
Being treated as baggage, it deprives Desdemona of the sense of autonomy and creates the
gap of understanding between father and daughter, which turns out to be the source of
Desdemona's tragic marriage.

A maiden never bold,
Of spirit so still and quiet that her motion
Blushed at herself. And she, in spite of nature,
Of years, of country, credit, everything,
To fall in love with what she feared to look on?
(1.3.94-98)

When Brabanzio describes Desdemona as "Of spirit so still and quiet" (1.3.95),
Desdemona's promise to Cassio about how she would persuade Othello shows the opposite: "I'll
watch him tame, and talk him out of patience. / His bed shall seem a school, his board a shrift. /
I'll intermingle every thing he does/ With Cassio's suit" (3.3.23-26). When Brabanzio insists that
Desdemona fears Othello, and cannot possibly fall in love with him, his judgment is immediately
proved wrong by Desdemona’s acknowledgement of her love. As the play unfolds itself, what
Desdemona says and the way she behaves overturn her image depicted by her father. When
Brabanzio cries out: “Fathers, from hence trust not your daughters' minds/ By what you see them
2

The analysis of the play is based on Shakespeare, William. Othello in The Norton Shakespeare. Edited by
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act.” (1.1.171-2), he is presenting his daughter as a deceptive figure. Such image of Desdemona is
later made used by Iago when he tries to convince Othello of her infidelity, and it leaves the seed
of doubt in Othello.
Nevertheless, the discrepancy in the images of Desdemona proves more about Brabanzio's
lack of understanding of his daughter than the intentional deception on the part of Desdemona.
Brabanzio's judgment about his daughter's love is based on her "nature, years, country, credit"
(1.3.96-97), and he only sees one side of Desdemona–she is trying to fulfill her responsibility as a
daughter by behaving properly in the household, while neglecting the other: Desdemona is
following his example when she chooses Othello. Driscoll argues that Desdemona "sees Othello's
visage in his mind, loves him because she believes him the noblest man she has ever known […].
She marries Othello and follows him to war to better understand men and their lives. And she
possesses intuition acute enough to sense in his polarized masculinity the catalyst her femininity
needs to spur growth toward wholeness. Desdemona's love for him expresses her larger quest for
the wholeness he can beget" (84). Yet, throughout the play, little evidence can be found to support
such quest for wholeness. Instead, Desdemona claims that she loves Othello for "his honors and
his valiant parts" (1.3.252), and Othello attributes his success in wooing Desdemona to "the
dangers I [he] had passed" (1.3.166). Danger, valor, and honors, these three words summarize
Othello's adventurous stories. Desdemona loves Othello because of his stories, and as the account
of Othello demonstrates, she is as attracted to Othello's stories as her father:

Her father loved me, oft invited me,
still questioned me the story of my life
From year to year, the battles, sieges, fortune
That I have passed. [...]
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These things to hear
Would Desdemona seriously incline,
but still the house affairs would draw her thence,
Which ever as she could with haste dispatch
She'd come again, and with a greedy ear
Devour up my discourse.
(1.3.127-149)

In Othello's narration, Desdemona is presented as her father's double. And the complicated
love-fear attitude towards Othello describes not only the mindset of Desdemona but also that of
Brabanzio. In my view, Desdemona is imitating her father, though unlike Brabanzio, her mind is
unbound by the social convention that a white Venetian girl is not supposed to marry a Moor.
Desdemona's love towards Othello is sincere, but just like Brabanzio, she only sees Othello as an
outsider, and her love is out of a Venetian's fantasy towards the exotic stories of a foreigner.
"I saw Othello’s visage in his mind" (1.3.251). Claiming that she understands Othello not
through the visage of his physical appearance but through that of his mind, Desdemona is actually
isolating him, admitting in a subtle way the racial difference between Othello and herself. As Berry
contends, "this implicit denial of physical attraction shows that Desdemona tries to separate
Othello's essential humanity from his appearance, but it also shows that she is sensitive to and
disquieted by the insinuations that there must be something unnatural in such a love" (321). The
way Desdemona understands her marriage to Othello stays close to how her father views their
marriage regarding its unnaturalness, although the latter tries to hamper the marriage by
emphasizing it while the former defends the marriage by downplaying it. That Desdemona sees
Othello as an exotic barbarian is made clearer by her other line: "I’ll watch him tame and talk him
out of patience" (3.3.23).
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Originally used to describe the wild animals that are "brought under control of man"
("Tame"), the word "tame" implies the sense of control, and it presents the image of Othello in
the eyes of Desdemona as a man in wild state. It echoes to how Iago calls Othello: "an old black
ram" (1.1.97), "a Barbary horse" (1.1.113), and reminds the audience of the monster-like image
of Othello depicted by Brabanzio: a "thing" with "sooty bosom" (1.2.71-72). Just like Brabanzio,
Desdemona never regards Othello as a member of Venice, and like her father, she never
understands Othello as a person:

and but my noble Moor
Is true of mind and made of no such baseness
As jealous creatures are, it were enough
To put him to ill thinking.
(3.4.24-27)
The way Desdemona talks about Othello is similar to the way her father talks about her,
both of which are filled with misunderstanding and soon proved to be illusory. When Desdemona
claims that Othello is "true of mind" (3.4.25), the latter is actually concealing from her his
suspicion of her infidelity until the moment he murders her; when Desdemona asserts that Othello
is not jealous, the way Othello acts proves the opposite. To Emilia 's question: "Is he not jealous?"
(3.4.27), the reply of Desdemona—"I think the sun where he was born drew all such humours from
him" (3.4.28-29)—both shows her naivety and reveals the danger in their marriage: she does not
really see him as who he is but only understands him through her imagination. It is ironical for
Othello to say that "she had eyes and chose me" (3.3.194). If the line reveals a hint of hope that
Desdemona understands him and accepts him, Othello loses the hope before long. Othello has to
remain as an outsider and resort to his exotic stories either to woo her or to daunt her (when he
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speaks about the magical power of the handkerchief). The anxiety of being an outsider on the part
of Othello lingers in their marriage, and the way Desdemona acts only adds to his anxiety.
The seemingly rebellious decision to marry Othello conceals Desdemona's underlying
desire to imitate her father, the primal influence on her in the household. In following her father,
she is denying herself the sense of personal agency; imitating her father's fantasy towards Othello
as an outsider, Desdemona is blind to who Othello is and what he desires as a person. The way
Desdemona treats Othello as an outsider conflicts with the latter's desire to be an insider, which
unsettles Othello and reduces him to a jealous wife-murderer.

3.3

The Double-Identity of Othello

When Othello first shows up in the play, he appears as a confident and composed general. He
refuses Iago's suggestion to run away from Desdemona's irritated father, talks confidently about
his service to the state, and rests assured that he has nothing to hide and nothing to fear. In front
of the furious Brabanzio, Othello talks in the tone of a protector towards the protected. His line
"Keep up your bright swords, for the dew will rust 'em" (1.2.60) reveals a hint of mockery.
Joking about the Venetians' trivial concern that "dew will rust" their bright swords, Othello is
indicating that for Brabanzio and his men, swords are more for decoration rather than for real
fighting, and they are displaying their slight skill in front of an experienced general. This line
implies the sense of superiority on the part of Othello, and such superiority is built upon the
reliance on him by Venice. Othello's importance to the state is reflected in the ways he is called
for: "You have been hotly called for, /When being not at your lodging to be found, / The Senate
hath sent about three several guests/ To search you out" (1.2.44-47), and thoroughly
demonstrated in Iago's analysis:
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for I do know the state
However this may gall him with some check
Cannot with safety cast him, for he’s embarked
With such loud reason to the Cyprus wars
Which even now stand in act, that, for their souls,
Another of his fathom they have none
To lead their business.
(1.1.148-154)

Soellner points out Othello's "overconfidence" (279) when the latter talks about his
"parts, title and perfect soul" (1.2.31); Berry, however, disputes the idea of pride by arguing that
"the inner course of this language is not pride but insecurity of the kind the Player Queen reveals
when Hamlet accuses her of protesting too much" (324). In my view, both the sense of pride and
the lack of security can be found in Othello both because of his double-identity in Venice and
Venetians' complicated attitude towards him. Desdemona's elopement becomes the catalyst in
bringing to surface the fear and contempt that lurks behind the love and respect on the part of the
Venetians, and from Othello's reaction, his sense of insecurity is revealed, which comes from his
self-understanding regarding his family lineage:

'Tis yet to know—
Which, when I know that boasting is an honor,
I shall promulgate. I fetch my life and being
From men of royal siege, and my demerits
May speak unbonneted to as proud a fortune
As this that I have reached.
(1.2.19-24)
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By the lines "I fetch my life and being from men of royal siege," (1.2.21-22), Othello
seems to indicate that he is a worthy match to Desdemona. Nevertheless, in the trial against him,
he only mentions his adventures and his service to the state, without bringing up his "royal siege"
(1.2.22) again. If the stories of adventures add to his personal charm as an exotic Venetian and
help explain how Desdemona falls in love with him, his foreign origin is something he can only
cherish secretly with those he trusts, and he has to hide it from the Venetian authorities. Othello's
self-understanding is split into two parts: both as an outsider and an insider, or as Greenblatt puts
it: he is "at once represent[ing] the institution and the alien" (234). In front of the Duke and the
senates, Othello is showing himself as a royal member of Venice who is dedicated to his service
to the state. Othello's self-awareness of being a Venetian is illustrated clear when he is in Cyprus.

Are we turned Turks? And to ourselves do that
Which heaven hath forbid the Ottomites?
For Christian shame, put by this barbarous brawl.
(2.3.153-155)

It is ironical that Othello uses the word "barbarous," which echoes to how Iago calls him
behind his back: the "Barbary horse" (1.1.113). And the warning "are we turned Turks?"
(2.3.153) demonstrates Othello's sense of demarcation between himself and foreigners like the
Turks. He is adopting the mindset of the Venetian, chiding the behavior of Montano and Cassio
from the perspective of an insider. Yet, when Othello tries to prove to others and to himself that
he is loved by the Venetians and the locals of Cyprus—"her father loved me" (1.3.127), "she had
eyes and chose me" (3.3.194), "the trust...I hold" (1.3.118), "I have found great love amongst
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them" (2.1.202)— Brabanzio demonstrates his contempt when he says: –"such a thing as
thou"(1.2.71), and by questioning Desdemona's love, Brabanzio is directly denying Othello's
worthiness for his daughter:

And she, in spite of nature,
Of years, of country, credit, everything,
To fall in love with what she feared to look on?
(1.3.96-98)
By "nature," Brabanzio is bringing up the "unnaturalness" of the marriage between
Desdemona and Othello; by "years," he expresses the concern about the age difference between
the couple, and the word "country" reveals Brabanzio's attitude that he never regards Othello as
one of his countrymen. His interest or "love" towards Othello is limited to the interest towards a
foreigner. Brabanzio can invite Othello to his family as guest, but he will never accept him as
part of the family. In the eyes of Brabanzio, there remains a line that Othello should not cross,
and it is the line that demarcates the insiders from the outsiders. When the Duke comforts
Brabanzio, the same as Desdemona, he is intentionally downplaying the blackness of Othello by
emphasizing his virtue:

If virtue no delighted beauty lack,
Your son-in-law is far more fair than black.
(1.3.287-288)
Talking about the (lack of) physical attraction of Othello's black skin, the Duke is
bypassing the concerns related to the skin color, which is not only an indicator of Othello's
identity as an outsider, but as Comensoli puts it, "in the Venetian court is a marker of negativity"
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(91). Under the threats of the Turks, both the Duke and the other senators are implanting in
Othello the illusion that the state needs and loves him, and Othello himself is embracing this
illusion until Brabanzio breaks it. When Brabanzio argues for the unworthiness of Othello to
marry his daughter, Othello cannot dispute it but merely resorts to his exotic stories, the only
weapon he can use to defend himself. When Brabanzio cries out: "look to her, Moor, if thou hast
eyes to see. /She has deceived her father, and may thee" (1.3.291-292), Othello does not give a
reply. Yet, as the play unfolds itself, the idea about the unnaturalness of his marriage and about
the deceptive nature of Desdemona starts to sink in and influences Othello's self-understanding
and understanding of his marriage.
Iago plays an important role in the transformation of Othello, but most of time Iago is
merely echoing Brabanzio, whose voice Othello cannot be deaf to. For instance, the line "she did
deceive her father, marrying you" (3.3.210) echoes Brabanzio's claim about his daughter's
deception. And the lines "I may fear/ her will, recoiling to her better judgment, / May fall to
match you with her country forms, and happily repent" (3.3.241-243) evoke Brabanzio's question
about Desdemona's love and bring up again the idea that Othello, the outsider, is an unworthy
match for Desdemona. By constantly reminding Othello of his foreign identity, Iago is trying to
make the latter feel isolated; at the same time, Iago is implanting in Othello the idea that he is the
only one Othello can trust and consult:
I know our country disposition well.
In Venice they do let God see the pranks
They dare not show their husbands. Their best conscience
Is not to leave ’t undone, but keep’t unknown.
(3.3.205-208)
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When Iago utters the line "I know our country disposition well" (3.3.205), he is adopting
the voice of an insider. And the discrepancy Iago mentions between how women seem and who
they really are immediately catches the attention of Othello, who acts like Iago's disciple and
asks: "Dost thou say so?" (3.3.209). Iago knows well how the warning of Brabanzio about
Desdemona's betrayal has left a seed of doubt in Othello, and he merely hastens the growth of
the seed by bringing it up again as Othello's friend and tutor. The bond Iago manages to establish
between himself and Othello entails the immediate falling-apart of Othello's marriage. The line
by Othello—"and so she did" (3.3.212)—shows that Othello is convinced by Iago of
Desdemona’s infidelity and and starts to interpret what he sees according to the guidance of Iago.

3.4

Othello's Self-Denial

After the conversation with Iago about Desdemona's possible deception, the previously confident
Othello starts to see himself in a negative way:

Haply, for I am black
And have not those soft parts of conversation
That chamberers have, or for I am declined
Into the vale of years—yet that’s not much—
She’s gone, I am abused, and my relief
Must be to loathe her. O, curse of marriage
That we can call these delicate creatures ours
And not their appetites! I had rather be a toad,
And live upon the vapour of a dungeon,
Than keep a corner in the thing I love
For others' uses
(3.3.266-277)
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This is the first time in the play that Othello mentions his dark skin, considering it as the
first reason that Desdemona betrays him. The image of a toad that lives "upon the vapour of a
dungeon" (3.3.275) reveals Othello's imagination of his despised self. Although he immediately
re-identifies himself by associating himself with the "great ones" (3.3.277) who, as he claims, are
more likely to have an unfaithful wife than the base, he sinks back into the struggle with his chaotic
self-understanding, which is shown by his lack of sleep. The "chaos" in the line "when I love thee
not, chaos is come again" (3.3.94) does not only refer to the chaos in Desdemona's life but also to
the chaos in Othello himself. When he says "farewell" (3.3.353-362) to his peace of mind, and to
the glorious war upon which the love towards him is based, he is actually negating his former self
and the confidence about his status in Venice.
If Othello's former self-understanding is built upon his belief that he is loved and
respected by the Venetians, then his new self-understanding is built upon hatred towards himself.
When Othello talks about his skin color for the second time, he relates it to the idea of filthiness
and evil: he describes his "begrimed" name as black (3.3.392), and calls the vengeance that arises
"from the hollow hell" as "black vengeance" (3.3.451). To the line of Iago: "would you would
bear your fortune like a man" (4.1.58), Othello replies: "a hornèd man’s a monster and a beast"
(4.1.59). Othello is now seeing himself in the exact same way Brabanzio sees him: a monster, a
beast, and an unworthy match for Desdemona, who "might lie by an emperor’s side and
command him tasks" (4.1.177). In his soliloquy in the bedroom scene, Othello is justifying to
himself why Desdemona has to die. The reason, he claims, is "else she'll betray more men"
(5.2.6). By this line, Othello is directly negating the possibility that Desdemona truly loves him,
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accepts him, and will not betray him. The sleeping Desdemona in Othello's eyes, Cavell
contends, is like "a piece of cold and carved marble" (126):

whiter skin of hers than snow
And smooth as monumental alabaster.
(5.2.4-5)

Yet, instead of "placing of a finite woman in the God" (Cavell, 126), I would argue that
Othello sees Desdemona as a stone wall, and she denies him access to her world. When Othello
commands Desdemona to think on her sins, Desdemona replies: "They are loves I bear to you"
(5.2.43) as if she were admitting that her love for him is sinful. The conversation between the
two echoes how the Venetians talk about their marriage: it is unnatural. When Brabanzio first
brings up the idea by accusing Othello of using "foul charms" (1.2.74) and "drugs or minerals"
(1.2.75) to seduce Desdemona, Othello defends himself and resorts to his exotic adventures;
when Iago evokes the discussion and warns Othello that Desdemona may be "recoiling to her
better judgment" (3.3.242), Othello starts to question his marriage but avoids further
conversation about it by dismissing Iago: "Farewell, farewell, / If more thou dost perceive, let me
know more" (3.3.243-244). Now that it seems Desdemona herself admits that her love towards
Othello is sinful (and thus "unnatural"), the sense of denial drives Othello to the action of
revenge. At this point of the play, Othello not only sees himself as a monster, but behaves like a
monster by smothering Desdemona without giving her a chance to defend herself and ignoring
her begging.
After killing Desdemona, Othello cries out: "Methinks it should be now a huge eclipse/
Of sun and moon, and that th' affrighted globe should yawn at alteration" (5.2.108-109). The
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idea of eclipse, together with Othello's repeated claim to "put out the light" (5.2.7), unveils his
eagerness to eliminate the difference between black and white. Yet, by wiping out the fair and
kind, only darkness and evil are left in Othello's inner world, and the movement of pulling the
curtains to hide the body of Desdemona from Emilia reveals Othello's awareness of his crime
and his intention to conceal it. Driscoll argues that "the only way Othello can escape intolerable
self-loathing is through loathing Desdemona" (74). However, loathing Desdemona and killing
merely plunges Othello deeper and deeper into the state of chaos and instability.

Othello: Why, how should she be murdered?
Emilia: Alas, who knows?
Othello: You heard her say herself it was not I.
Emilia: She said so, I must needs report the truth.
Othello: She's like a liar gone to burning hell.
T'was I that killed her.
(5.2.134-139)

In the conversation with Emilia, Othello behaves strangely and contradicts himself when
he talks about the death of Desdemona. He has almost turned into Iago's double, pretending his
ignorance of Desdemona's death—"how should she be murdered?" (5.2.134), lying about his
innocence—"it was not I" (5.2.136), but immediately negates it afterwards—"t'was I that killed
her" (5.2.139). Although when the truth comes out, Othello partially resumes his former self by
talking about his honors again: "An honourable murderer, if you will,/ For naught I did in hate,
but all in honour" (5.2.300-301), the monstrous-like part of him remains with him. As Greenblatt
points out, "The Moor at once represents the institution and the alien, the conqueror and the
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infidel" (234). And the image of Othello that has been torn apart in his self-understanding is
demonstrated in the conversation between Othello and Lodovico:

Lodovico: where is this rash and most unfortunate man?
Othello: that's he that was Othello. Here I am.
(5.2.289-290)

Throughout the play, Othello has been switching the roles between an insider and an
outsider. He performs as an insider during the first trial against himself by concealing his family
lineage in front of the Venetian authority, and he acts like a monstrous outsider when he negates
his former self and extends the hatred towards himself to the hatred towards others. At the
second trial of the play, however, he is no longer able to demarcate himself from the Turks nor
can he forget his honorable service to the state. He is both the outsider and the insider, the Turk
that commits crime and the Venetian that punishes him, and it is the irreconcilable conflict
between these two identities that leads to the tragic death of Othello.
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CHAPTER 4. HAMLET: PERTURBATION OF THE SELF

4.1

The Jealousy of Hamlet

From the beginning of the play, Hamlet is depicted as a melancholic prince with his "inky coat,"
constant sighs and tears. As Claudius observes later, “Nor what he spake, though it lacked form a
little/ Was not like madness. There’s something in his soul/ O’er which his melancholy sits on
brood” (3.1.163-165). Johann Wolfgang Goethe and his followers attribute Hamlet's melancholy
to his "soul of a poet, too sensitive, delicate, and complex to endure the cruel pressures of a coarse
world" (Greenblatt, 1684). A second group of critics contend that it is the struggle for selffulfillment that lies behind the tragic hero's moodiness. Walter N. King, for instance, considers the
source of Hamlet's melancholy to be his “compulsive search for meaning” (51). James P. Driscoll
sees behind Hamlet's melancholy "the archetypal drive to achieve self-knowledge and
individuation before undertaking the supreme task his fate presents" (51). Rolf Soellner, similarly,
interprets Hamlet "as a frustrated seeker for an ideal human mold" (184).
A third group of critics interpret Hamlet's melancholy as an expression of anxiety, though
their opinions diverge concerning what Hamlet is anxious about. Paul A. Jorgensen argues that
"what Hamlet is expressing, and what Shakespeare is expressing through Hamlet is a restlessness,
an urgency, an anxiety, more narrowly a time-consciousness, that is so general in the Renaissance
that it may be loosely called the neurosis of the era" (133). Maynard Mack observes the "the
powerful sense of mortality in Hamlet," which is conveyed in three ways: "human weakness,"
"infection," and "a profound consciousness of loss" (515-516). Stephen Greenblatt shares Mack's
idea about infection and argues that "the roots of Hamlet's despair" lies not only in "the cold, inert
matter produced by the nauseating triumph of death" but also in the "living matter pullulating with
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tenacious, meaningless vitality, produced by the equally nauseating triumph of life." To the eyes
of the desperate prince, Greenblatt writes, the center of the decadent world is "the body of woman"
(1689), and this viewpoint is related to the arguments raised by the fourth group of critics.
The fourth group of critics argue that the problematic relation between Hamlet and
Gertrude is the source of Hamlet's struggle. When the Freudian school of criticism lays stress on
Hamlet's Oedipus complex, other critics focus on the negative effect Gertrude’s conduct on Hamlet.
A. C. Bradley, for instance, asserts that Hamlet's melancholy and sickness of life is due to "the
moral shock of the sudden ghastly disclosure of his mother's true nature, falling on him when his
heart was aching with love, and his body doubtless was weakened by sorrow" (118). T. S. Eliot
contends that Shakespeare’s Hamlet is "a play dealing with the effect of a mother’s guilt upon her
son [...]. Hamlet is up against the difficulty that his disgust is occasioned by his mother, but that
his mother is not an adequate equivalent for it; his disgust envelops and exceeds her. It is thus a
feeling which he cannot understand; he cannot objectify it, and it therefore remains to poison life
and obstruct action" (57-58). David Leverenz follows Eliot's idea, pointing out that "Hamlet's selfdoubt is joined to Gertrude's insufficiency" (307) and his "real struggle is to restore his mother's
validation of his feelings" (306), but unlike Eliot, Leverenz argues that these are not the flaws of
the play; instead, "they are flaws in the patriarchal order, which has cracked all the mirrors for selfconfirmation" (308).
The objective of this chapter is to analyze the perturbation of Hamlet's mind by following
A. J. Greimas's discussion of passion. It aims to argue that jealousy is the source of Hamlet's
melancholy, and the melancholic prince gradually loses sight of what manner of man he should be
when he denies "the helps of the intellectual, morall and theological vertues" (Perrott, 45).
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Jealousy, as A. J. Greimas writes, is a “compounded” passion. According to Oxford English
Dictionary, the state of jealousy refers to 1) “zeal or vehemence of feeling against some person or
thing; anger, wrath, indignation. 2) zeal or vehemence of feeling in favour of a person or thing;
devotion, eagerness, anxiety to serve 3) solicitude or anxiety for the preservation or well-being of
something; vigilance in guarding a possession from loss or damage, 4) the state of mind arising
from the suspicion, apprehension, or knowledge of rivalry” ("jealousy"). Accordingly, the passion
of jealousy involves the participation of three parties: the jealous subject (S1), the person that is
loved (O), and the rival (S2). The relationships between them can be summarized as:

1)

S1—O: attachment. The desire of the jealous subject (S1) to protect his right and
possess person O exclusively.

2)

S1—O: demand. The jealous one demands the complete faithfulness of person O so
as to preserve the latter's love.

3)

S1—S2&O: suspicion. Since the desire for exclusive possession is unfulfillable, it
leads to S1’s suspicion of the conjunction between the person he loves and his rival
S2. Such suspicion brings about worry and suffering to the jealous subject (S1).

4)

S1—S2: resentment. The rivalry between S1 and S2 for person O causes S1’s
resentment and the desire for revenge.

The relation between S1, S2 and O depicts the relation between Hamlet, Claudius and
Gertrude. Hamlet was caught in the passion of jealousy, which “is organized around a dysphoric
event that can be located either prospectively or retrospectively, thus transforming the jealous one
into either a fearful subject or a suffering subject” (Greimas, 13). His claim to revenge the murder
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of his father disguises his desire for vengeance on Claudius because the latter deprives him of his
mother’s love. Consumed by overflowing jealousy, Hamlet gradually gets lost in his understanding
regarding what manner of man he should be. This is the third part of consideration in Perrott's
system of self-knowledge, which is focused on the study of one's own mind.

4.1.1

S1 (Hamlet)—O (Gertrude): Attachment

The moment Hamlet shows up in the paly, he appears with the air of moodiness—wearing black
clothes, weeping, with “the clouds still hang[ing] on” (2.1.66). Nevertheless, although his
melancholy is boldly shown, the reason for this melancholy remains unknown to Claudius and
Gertrude, who attribute it to Hamlet’s mourning for his father at the beginning of the play. When
Gertrude tries to persuade Hamlet out of his moodiness— “Do not forever with thy vailed lids/
Seek for thy noble father in the dust./ Thou kown’st this common—All that lives must dies,
/Passing through nature to eternity” 3 (2.2.70-73)—Hamlet simply replies, “Ay, madam, it is
common” (2.2.74). And when Gertrude questions him, “Why seems it so particular with thee?”
(2.2.75), the verb “seem” agitates Hamlet. It not only pains him because of his mother's failure to
recognize “that within which passeth show” (2.2.85), but it is the “seeming” of his mother that
causes his melancholy. In Hamlet’s first soliloquy, he laments,

Why, she would hang on him
As if increase of appetite had grown
By what it fed on, and yet, within a month—
Let me not think on't. Frailty, thy name is woman!—

3

The analysis of the play is based on Shakespeare, William. The Tragedy of Hamlet, Prince of Denmark
in The Norton Shakespeare. Edited by Stephen Greenblatt, et al. Second Edition. New York: W. W.
Norton &Company. 2008. pp. 1696-1784.
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A little month, or ere those shoes were old
With which she followed my poor father’s body,
Like Niobe, all tears. Why she, even she—
O God, a beast that wants discourse of reason
Would have mourned longer!—married with my uncle,
My father’s brother, but no more like my father
Than I to Hercules. Within a month,
Ere yet the salt of most unrighteous tears
Had left the flushing in her gallèd eyes,
She married. O most wicked speed, to post
With such dexterity to incestuous sheets!
It is not nor it cannot come to good,
But break, my heart, for I must hold my tongue.
(1.2.143-159)

Not until this soliloquy does Hamlet reveal (to himself) the source of his melancholy: the
hasty betrayal of his mother. According to Hamlet, the more profound Gertrude’s love for the late
King Hamlet “seemed” to be, the more ironical her speedy marriage with Claudius appears. In the
soliloquy, Hamlet emphasizes multiple times the “hastiness” of her mother’s remarriage: "a little
month" (1.2.147), "wicked speed" (1.2.156), "with such dexterity" (1.2.157), and so forth. Because
of her fickleness, Gertrude’s love for the late King Hamlet is just a "seeming" in the eyes of Hamlet.
Before criticizing his mother's overhasty marriage, Hamlet expresses his suicidal desire
and his anger towards the world: "how weary, stale, flat, and unprofitable seem to me all the uses
of this world!" (1.2.133-134) as if it is because of his mother's remarriage that both the life of
himself and the existence of the world lose meaning (1.2.137). In this soliloquy, Eliot argues,
Hamlet is dominated by such pain and self-loathing that "is in excess of the facts as they appear"
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(58). Why exactly does Gertrude's re-marriage arouse such mental turmoil in Hamlet? The answer
may be revealed indirectly in Hamlet’s conversation with Claudius and Gertrude:

Claudius: For your intent
In going back to school in Wittenberg,
It is most retrograde to our desire.
And we beseech you, bend you to remain
Here in the cheer and comfort of our eye,
Our chiefest courtier, cousin, and our son.
Gertrude: Let not thy mother lose her prayers, Hamlet.
I pray thee, stay with us. Go not to Wittenberg.
Hamlet: I shall in all my best obey you, madam.
(2.2.112-120)

In this dialogue, Hamlet ignores Claudius and answers directly to Gertrude’s request. He
agrees to stay in Denmark, which is a “prison” (2.2.241) in his eyes, not because he wants to avenge
his father (at this point of the play, he has not yet heard about Claudius’s murder), but because of
his desire for the exclusive possession of his mother’s love. Throughout the play, Hamlet has been
trying to justify his resentment towards Claudius, but whichever justifications he can find, be it the
murder of his father or Claudius's plan to send him to death, they simply add to the resentment
Hamlet already bears. And this resentment arises from Hamlet's attachment to his mother.
In the play, Hamlet is closely watched by other characters, but at the same time, he is
actively playing the role of an observer of his mother. In the scene of play-within-the-play, the
main object of Hamlet's observation before the play begins is not Claudius but the queen. Hamlet
declines his mother's invitation to sit by her so that he can better observe her reaction. And the
cheerfulness of Gertrude again pains Hamlet: "For look you how cheerfully my mother looks, /
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and my father died with in's two hours" (3.2.114-115). By exaggerating the short lapse of time
from his father's death, Hamlet mourns about the fact that his father has been forgotten by his
mother. On the surface, Hamlet seems to be upset about Gertrude's betrayal to his father. However,
rather than demanding her loyalty towards his father who has already passed away, it is his
mother’s loyalty towards himself that Hamlet desires. By guarding his mother’s love to his father
(who is no longer there), Hamlet demands that her love should not be taken away by anyone else.

4.1.2

S1 (Hamlet)—O (Gertrude): Demand

The second feature of the relation between the jealous subject (Hamlet) and the person he loves
(Gertrude) is demand. Hamlet demands the faithfulness of his mother, which is unfulfillable
because of Gertrude's remarriage. In his first soliloquy, Hamlet cries out, “frailty, thy name is
woman” (1.2.145). During the play-with-the-play, he is trying to probe into Gertrude's conscience
by asking her opinion about the vows of the player queen. When Gertrude simply comments on
the player's acting, Hamlet replies: "O, but she'll keep her word" (3.2.211), implying that Gertrude
is worse than the player queen since she will "keep her word" while Gertrude did not. Here again,
Hamlet is playing the role of an observer of his mother, and along with his plan to confirm the
crime of Claudius, he designs the Mousetrap to secure the love of Gertrude again by reminding
her of keeping her word. Immediately after the play, Hamlet is summoned by his mother to her
bedroom. By showing the ugliness of his uncle in comparison to his father and demonstrating the
unnaturalness of Gertrude of remarriage, the demand of Hamlet is made clearer: "go not to mine
uncle's bed " (3.4.150). Yet, at the end of the conversation with his mother, Hamlet simply obtains
her promise not to betray his secrete about the pretended madness. Hamlet's demand cannot be
fulfilled until he can finally justify the crime of Claudius and take revenge on him.
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4.1.3

S1 (Hamlet)—S2&O (Gertrude and Claudius): Suspicion

The formula “S1—S2&O” depicts the relation between the jealous subject and the objects of his
speculation. In the play, the main suspicion centers on whether Claudius has murdered the late
King Hamlet. And Hamlet, despite what he claims, remains unable to confirm his suspicion. To
begin with, the source of Hamlet’s suspicion, the Ghost’s word, remains ambiguous, for it comes
from a phenomenon whose nature is open to question. The phrase "looks like" has been used
multiple times for the description of the Ghost.

Barnardo: In the same figure like the king that’s dead
Marcellus [to Horatio]: Thou art a scholar—speak to it, Horatio.
Barnardo: Looks it not like the king? —Mark it, Horatio.
Horatio: Most like. It harrows me with hear and wonder.
[...]
Marcelus: Is it not like the king?
(1.1.39-57)

When the Ghost finally speaks, he speaks to Hamlet exclusively, and no one else knows
the identity of the Ghost except Hamlet himself. It remains debatable whether the conversation
between Hamlet and the Ghost is merely another imagination of the dreamy prince. During the
conversation with Horatio, Hamlet admits,

Hamlet: My father—methink I see my father.
Horatio: Where, my Lord,
Hamlet: In my mind’s eye, Horatio.
(1.2.183-184)
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And in act 2, scene 2, after Hamlet finishes planning the Mousetrap to catch the conscience
of Claudius, his consideration switches back to the nature of the Ghost. Hamlet’s doubt continues:

The spirit that I have seen
May be the devil, and the devil hath power
T’assume a pleasing shape. Yea, and perhaps
Out of my weakness and my melancholy,
As he is very potent with such spirits,
Abuses me to damn me. I’ll have grounds
More relative than this. The play’s the thing
wherein I’ll catch the conscience of the king.
(2.2.574-582)

In act 3 scene 4, when Hamlet accuses Gertrude of her betrayal, only Hamlet can see the
Ghost that enters and urges him to take revenge. As C. S. Lewis argues, "the Hamlet formula, so
to speak, is not a 'man who has to avenge his father' but 'a man who has been given a task by a
ghost. Everything else about him is less important than that" (95). In the play, the image of the
Ghost crystalizes the evil that each character can see. To Horatio and the other courtiers, the Ghost
is a sign of the decay of the country: "something is rotten in the state of Denmark" (1.3.67), but
for Hamlet, it signifies the unnatural relationship between himself, Claudius, and Gertrude. Hamlet
is jealous of Claudius because he shares Gertrude's love that Hamlet desires to be exclusively his,
and he needs a proper reason to take revenge on Claudius. The Ghost as his father who seeks
revenge becomes Hamlet's reason. This explains why he is not the only that sees the Ghost but he
is the only one to whom the Ghost reveals the murder. And Hamlet's eagerness to speak to the
Ghost reveals his longing to justify his hatred towards Claudius.
However, Hamlet's suspicion remains a suspicion. Although Claudius is agitated by
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Mousetrap, and loses self-control “upon the talk of the poisoning” (3.2.271), direct evidence—
Claudius’s own admission—is missing for Hamlet to confirm the latter’s crime. Without this
evidence, Claudius’s reaction is still open to interpretation: it can either be his fear of Hamlet or
the pang of conscience that leads to his agitation. As Greenblatt points out: "the murderer in the
play within the play is 'one Lucianus, nephew to the King' (3.2.223). Claudius's anger could have
arisen from the spectacle of the player-nephew killing his player-uncle and not from the spectacle
of his own hidden crime" (1687). In addition, the line of Claudius—"give me some light" (3.2.
247)–further adds to the ambiguity. The word "light" appears at the critical moments in both
Macbeth and Othello. Macbeth mentions light when he murmurs his desire to murder Duncan:
"Let not light see my black and deep desires" (1.4.51); and Othello repeats the word "light"
multiple times before he strangles Desdemona: "Put out the light, and then put out the light [...]
but once put out thy light, / Thou cunning'st pattern of excelling nature, / I know not where is that
Promethean heat/ That can thy light relume" (5.2.7-13). Light stands for both justice and life, which
both Macbeth and Othello wish to wipe out before committing their crimes. Yet, in the case of
Claudius, he cries out for light, as if he were begging either for life or for justice that the light
represents. Although Claudius's reaction to the Mousetrap is highly perceptible, the meaning
behind it remains obscure.

Hamlet: Didst perceive?
Horatio: Very well, my lord
Hamlet: Upon the talk of the pois'ning?
Horatio: I did very well note him.
(3.2.264-267)
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During the conversation between Hamlet and Horatio after Claudius leaves, Horatio admits
that he noticed Claudius's behavior but does not provide any interpretation of it. The playwright
conceals from Hamlet the knowledge that the audience is given, and leaves the tragic hero groping
in the dark: the moment Claudius finishes acknowledging his crime, Hamlet enters, just missing
the confirmation that he has been looking for. This is a very intricate moment. Although the
audience knows that Claudius is guilty, and Hamlet has every reason to suspect it, the crime of
Claudius remains impenetrable to him. There is a line that Hamlet is unable to cross, which
demarcates facts and suspicion, and Hamlet still stays on the side of suspicion.
"The principal question in criticism of Hamlet would not be why Hamlet delays," John D.
Cox argues in Seeming Knowledge: Shakespeare and Skeptical Faith, "but whether or not Claudius
is guilty […] It makes the play a challenging vision of human uncertainty in a distinctively
religious setting that is charged with profound moral seriousness" (159-160). Yet, since Claudius
has confessed his sins at the prayer—"O, my offence is rank. It smells to heaven. / It hath the
primal eldest curse upon’t, / A brother’s murder (3.3.36-38), the principal question should not be
"whether or not Claudius is guilty," but whether Hamlet should keep the suspicion when he misses
the key information, or whether he should cast away his doubt and simply accept what he witnesses
as confirmation of Claudius's crime. If Claudius is guilty, and the play is purely about revenge,
then why does Hamlet postpone his action? Eugene England argues that Hamlet's delay is due to
his doubt about the revenge pattern. David Leverenz considers Hamlet's delay as "a natural
reaction to overwhelming interpersonal confusion [...]. His self-preoccupation is paradoxically
grounded not so much in himself as in the extraordinary and unremitting array of 'mixed signals'
that spate role from self, reason from feeling, duty from love" (292-93). Walter N. King attributes
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Hamlet’s delay to his “compulsive search for meaning” (76). Yet, another possible reading can be:
Hamlet procrastinates his vengeance because he is unable to confirm his suspicion.
Witnessing Claudius's reaction to Mousetrap, Hamlet is seemingly convinced of what he
wants to believe. And if this is the case, then at this point of the play, he has reason, strong desire—
"I should have fatted all the region kites, / With this slave’s offal. Bloody, Bawdy villain! /
Remorseless, treacherous, lecherous, kindles villain! /O Vengeance!" (2.2.556-559)—and physical
power to take revenge on Claudius. Yet again, he delays his action.
In Hamlet’s most famous soliloquy, he ponders about life and death, and he is trying to probe
into it and find the reason that holds him from his revenge.

Who would fardels bear,
To grunt and sweat under a weary life,
But that the dread of something after death,
The undiscovered country from whose bourn
No traveler returns, puzzles the will
And makes us rather bear those ills we have
Than fly to others that we know not of?
And thus the native hue of resolution
Is sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought,
And enterprises of great pith and moment
With this regard their currents turn awry,
And lose the name of action.
(3.1.78-89)

As Hamlet admits, what he fears is not death itself but “something after death” (3.1.80).
Regarding this “something,” Hamlet does not explain what exactly it is, but according to the text,
it is because of the thought of this “something” that “conscience does make cowards of us all”
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(3.1.85). Thus, conscience—the moral sense of right or wrong—correlates the “something after
death” that Hamlet fears, and his action before death. One possible reading can be: Hamlet
postpones his action because he has conscientious concerns about his unjustifiable revenge, and
these concerns disturb him and make him worry about the punishment he is about to face after
death. If Hamlet believes without doubt that Claudius has murdered the late King Hamlet, together
with the revenge tradition, his action of vengeance on Claudius can be justified.
The revenge tradition, as Greenblatt summaries, has the following features: 1) it is an
“individual response to an intolerable wrong or public insult […] in a world whose institution seem
unable or unwilling to satisfy a craving for justice;” 2) it “follows a devious path toward its violent
end;” 3) “the revenger is in the grip of an inner compulsion” to seek psychic satisfaction; 4)
satisfaction will be gained at the “moment of declaration and vindication;” 5) it is "a universal
imperative more powerful than the pious injunction of any particular belief system, including
Christianity itself” (1686). Although revenge in general is “a kind of wild justice," according to
Francis Bacon, "the most tolerable sort of revenge is for those wrongs which there is no law to
remedy” (16-17). In the case of Hamlet, even if Claudius can be confirmed, against the king,
Hamlet can resort to no law but take it upon himself to correct the wrong. This is the kind of
revenge that fits into the occasion Bacon mentions and can be tolerated. Then what would be the
conscientious concerns that prevent Hamlet from taking action? Why is he unable to rid himself
of suspicion?
Hamlet feels the strong desire to take revenge on Claudius, but whether or not Claudius has
murdered his father remains uncertain. Hamlet is unable to fully justify his action due to his
doubt. To act or not to act for him involves a moral issue. To act, Hamlet is disturbed by the
pang of conscience; not to act, he suffers from the pain caused by the unfulfillable desire. Some
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critics argues that there is no delay on the part of Hamlet; others contend that Hamlet delays his
revenge, and his procrastination is due to the fact that he thinks too much. In Shakespeare's
Hamlet: a New Theory, or, What Was the Poet's Intention in the Play?, Harold Ford writes,
“notwithstanding, some of the greatest commentators have taken him [Hamlet] to task, not for
thinking too little, but too much, thus ‘crippling the power of action” (26). This idea is not
ungrounded, although opinions are divided with respect to why thinking too much impedes
action. Based on the analysis above, if the decision about acting or not acting involves moral
concerns for Hamlet, then the more he ponders upon it, the more his conscience prevents him,
despite his desire, from acting. Hamlet is oscillating between the pang of conscience and his
desire for vengeance, and the first murder he commits in the play is done only blindly. He stabs
Polonius who is hiding behind the arras, assuming that the one he kills is Claudius.

Gertrude: O me, what hast thou done?
Hamlet: Nay, I know not. Is it the King?
(3.4.24-25)

Ironically, however, right before the moment, Hamlet decides that he will wait until
Claudius "is drunk asleep, or in his rage, / Or in th'incestuous pleasure of bed, / At gaming,
swearing or about some act/ That has no relish of salvation in't" (3.3.89-92). The discrepancy
between Hamlet's behavior and his plan reveals that the argument about salvation, though it
sounds convincing, hides the real reason that Hamlet did not murder Claudius at his prayer: he is
not able to do so knowingly, i.e., to choose revenge murder. The same as Macbeth, the sight of
killing troubles Hamlet, and for Hamlet, it is not a justifiable killing but a murder out of
resentment and jealousy.
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4.1.4 S1 (Hamlet)—S2 (Claudius): Resentment
Hamlet harbors his resentment towards Claudius before the appearance of the Ghost, namely,
before he was informed of Claudius's crime against his father.

Claudius: But now, my cousin Hamlet, and my son—
Hamlet: (aside) a little more than kin and less than kind.
Claudius: How is it that the clouds still hang on you?
Hamlet: Not so, my lord. I am too much i’ the sun.
(1.2.64-67)

By playing with the alliteration of “kin” and “kind” (1.2.65), Hamlet expresses his
reluctance to accept Claudius as his step-father: indeed, they are closely related in kinship (“more
than kin”), but Claudius is not the kind of father that Hamlet would want (“less than kind”). In
addition, as Greenblatt points out in the footnote to the line, by the word "kind," Hamlet indicats
"the incestuousness of the marriage that has produced their unnatural relationship" (1702). The
homophony of “sun” and “son” further reveals Hamlet’s antipathy to be son of Claudius. If at this
moment of the play, Hamlet’s hostility towards Claudius is not due to his awareness that the latter
murdered his father, it can only be explained by his aversion to his mother's hasty marriage to
Claudius, and by the hatred of a jealous son, who suffers from the fact that his mother’s love has
been shared by other man. The encounter with the Ghost simply adds to Hamlet's resentment and
provides him with reason to avenge against Claudius.
Because of his jealousy, Hamlet becomes a mixed figure in his “perpetual hesitation,” who
“cannot fix his terms (Greimas, 138). To Horatio, Hamlet admits, "in my heart there was a kind of
fighting/ That would not let me sleep. Methought I lay/ Worse than the mutines in the bilboes"
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(5.2.4-6). The more he struggles, the tighter Hamlet is trapped inside, and during the crisis of his
life, the identities according to which Hamlet understands himself collapse one by one.

4.2 The Collapse of Identities
The first identity of Hamlet is the son of an excellent king. Yet, this identity is problematic not
only because of the death of the father, the ambiguity about the Ghost, but also because of the
illusory ideal Hamlet creates about Late King Hamlet. "So excellent a king, that was to this/
Hyperion to a satyr" (1.2.139-140), Hamlet claims; and in front of his mother, he further
exaggerates the beauty of his father:

The front of Jove himself,
An eye like Mars to threaten and command,
A station like the herald Mercury
New-lighted on a heaven-kissing hill—
A combination and a form indeed
Where every god did seem to set his seal
To give the world assurance of a man.
(3.4.55-61)

However, in the recount of the courtiers, King Hamlet is not so eminent a king as Hamlet
proclaims. According to Horatio, the king is ferocious: "so frowned he once when in an angry
parley/ He smote the sledded Polacks on the ice" (1.1.61-62). And the appearance of the Ghost
continues to deepen the gap between the image Hamlet creates and who King Hamlet really was.
To begin with, the nature of the Ghost has been troubling Hamlet. If Hamlet refuses to believe
what the Ghost tells him, he would fail to justify the hatred he harbors towards Claudius, unable
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to take revenge on the latter in the name of his father. Trusting the Ghost's words and regarding
the latter as his father, however, Hamlet has to accept the image of his father as someone who
has committed "foul crimes" (1.5.12) in his life and is suffering horrible punishment because of
his infringements. Despite Hamlet's desire, after the death of his father, his identity of being the
son of an excellent king soon collapsed, and Hamlet is immediately given a new identity—son of
Claudius. This is the identity Hamlet is most loath to accept, but this identity is immediately
connected to the third identity of Hamlet—the head of the country.

His greatness weighed, his will is not his own,
For he himself is subject to his birth.
He may not, as unvalued persons do,
Carve for himself, for on his choice depends
The safety and health of this whole state.
(1.3.17-21)

In the conversation with Ophelia, Laertes calls Hamlet "the head" (1.3.24) of the state, a
head that is bound by his responsibility to Denmark. Similar idea of Hamlet is shared by Ophelia,
in whose eyes, he is a noble prince, a "glass of fashion" (3.1.152) that the state models after. Yet,
the phrase she uses—"th'observed of all observers" (3.1.153)—both indicates that at the moment,
Hamlet is watched closely by Claudius and Polonius, and implies Hamlet's lack of freedom
because of his identity as a prince. For Hamlet, only once in the play has he expressed concern
for the well-being of country:

This heavy-headed revel east and west
Makes us traduced and taxed of other nations.
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They clepe us drunkards and with swinish phrase
Soil our addition. And indeed it takes
From our achievements, though performed at height,
The pith and marrow of our attribute.
(1.4.18.1-18.6)

Although by these lines Hamlet mainly aims to criticize the country under Claudius's
government, what he says reveals a sense of responsibility that is appropriate for Hamlet's
identity as a prince. But such sense does not last long before he feels suffocated by his status in
Denmark. "Denmark's a prison" (2.2.239), Hamlet claims. And at the beginning of the play, he
confesses in front of Horatio that he forgets himself: "Horatio–or I do forget myself" (1.2.161).
At the end of the play, Hamlet brings up the same idea again.

That to Laertes I forgot myself,
For by the image of my cause I see
The portraiture of his.
(5.2.77-78)

The first time Hamlet mentions that he forgets himself, he is dominated by jealousy and
melancholy. The second time he talks about it is immediately after he lost control of himself by
the sight of Laertes's exuberant grief and desire for revenge. Instead of being a role model
himself, Hamlet is longing for a role model he can imitate and according to which he
understands himself. Nevertheless, since the death of his father and the over-hasty remarriage of
his mother, the images of Hamlet's role models collapse one by one, and from beginning till the
end, the self that Hamlet forgets has never been recovered. Stimulated by the sight of Fortinbras's
army and Laertes's passion, Hamlet attempts to choose Fortinbras and Laertes as his new models.
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Yet, these new models are no less problematic than the former: one dominated by blind
ambition—"Exposing what is mortal and unsure/ to all that fortune, death, and danger dare, /
even for an eggshell" (4.4.9.41-9.43), the other consumed by hatred and longing for revenge.
Following his new models, Hamlet is sinking deeper and deeper into the perturbations of his
mind and gradually losses sight of what manner of man he should be.

4.3 Failure to Conquer the Perturbations of Mind
The consideration of "what manner of man" one is, together with "what one is," "who one is,"
according to James Perrott, constitutes one's self-understanding. By "manner," Perrott refers to
one's education, wisdom, and perturbations of the mind. Differently put, the third part of selfknowledge is about the study of human mind, and what Perrott aims at in this section is to
propose the ways of conquering the perturbations of mind via "the helps of the intellectual,
morall and theological vertues" (45). In the case of Hamlet, however, to fulfill the task of
revenge, he forsakes those virtues that can help him restore his self-understanding. Hamlet
gradually loses himself during the struggle with his perturbations.
After the encounter with the Ghost, Hamlet immediately calls into doubt human
knowledge: "There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio, / Than are dreamt of in our
philosophy" (1.5.168-169). And in the conversation with Rosencrantz and Guildenstern about the
fickleness of the commoners, Hamlet brings up again the uselessness of philosophy, regarding it
useless to fix the "unnaturalness" of the country: "there is something in this more than natural, /
if philosophy could find it out" (2.2.350-351). In both of these occasions, Hamlet denies the help
from his academic training; and stirred by the words of the Ghost, he claims to wipe out his
former academic engagement as a way to demonstrate his determination to part from the past:
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I'll wipe away all trivial fond records,
All saws of books, all forms, all pressures past,
that youth and observation copied there.
(1.5.99-101)

Admittedly, the sight of Fortinbras's army stimulates Hamlet to ponder over the nature of
man. Yet, at the same time admitting that human beings are separated from animals because of
reasoning faculty, Hamlet finds neither the "excitement of [my] reason" nor passion sufficient
enough to motivate himself for action.

How stand I then,
That have a father killed, a mother stained,
Excitements of my reason and my blood,
And let all sleep—while, to my shame
(4.4.9.46-49)
When the intellectual help is found useless by Hamlet, the "moral virtue" is that which
constantly pulls him back from his plan of revenge. As Hamlet confesses in his fourth soliloquy,
it is his conscience and the imagination of what he is about to face after death that "sicklied
o'ver" his resolution (3.1.87). And in his last soliloquy (the one stimulated by Fortinbras's army),
Hamlet further probes into the thought that holds him back:

Of thinking too precisely on th'event
A though which, quartered, hath but one part wisdom
and ever three parts coward.
(4.4.9.31-33)
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The "one part wisdom" may refer to Hamlet's moral consideration about his resentment and his
plan to take revenge on Claudius. The jealousy underlying his resentment as well as the possible
consequences frightens him and turns him into a "coward" (4.4.9.33). Hamlet has never lost sight
of what has been troubling him, but he gets bogged down about how to move out of it and where
he should head towards. Inspired by the ambition of Fortinbras, Hamlet's desire for movement is
fuelled up again, and what occupies his mind is no longer the consideration of right or wrong but
simply to get out of the dissatisfaction with "lack of advancement" (3.2.311). Hamlet is longing
for action and for change, and he has to reassure himself again why his action is justified: "have
a father killed, a mother stained" (4.4.9.47). But these are merely the pretexts for himself to make
his move, and what is hidden after them is Hamlet's bloody thought and his jealousy.

Oh, from this time forth,
My thoughts be bloody, or be nothing worth!
(4.4.9.55-56)

By these lines, Hamlet makes up his mind to leave aside his moral consideration, his
behavior becomes more reckless. When Hamlet finds out that he murdered Polonius, he repents
for his action and talks about the possible punishment from heaven:

For this same lord,
I do repent. But heaven hath pleased it so,
To punish me with this and this with me,
That I must be their scourge and minister.
(3.4.156-160)
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However, when he sends Guildenstern and Rosencrantz to immediate death, he does so
without hesitation nor regret. "They are not near my conscience" (5.2.59), Hamlet claims; yet,
the reason he lists why Guildenstern and Rosencrantz should die can also be applied for
Polonius:

Their defeat
Does by their own insinuation grow.
'Tis dangerous when the baser nature comes
Between the pass and fell incensèd points
Of mighty opposites.
(5.2.59-63)

None of them commit any crime but simply take the order of Claudius. Hamlet's different
attitudes towards the murders he commits reveals the change of his inner world: he casts away the
consideration of conscience and the consequences of his actions. In the grave-digger scene,
Hamlet's mind is troubled by the sight of the the dead bodies: whoever these men were, and
whatever the did, when they die, their bodies end up being corrupted in the same way. When
Hamlet talks about death at this point of the play, his "great soul" or divine judgment no longer
concerns him, and all he can see is merely the corruption of the dead bodies and the futility of
planning and thinking.

Rashly—
And praised be rashness for it: let us know
Our indiscretion sometimes serves us well
When our deep plots do pall, and that should teach us
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There’s a divinity that shapes our ends,
Rough-hew them how we will—
(5.2.6-11)

Some critics interpret these lines as indicator of a positive change in Hamlet after the
after his sea voyage. Jorgensen, for instance, argues that Hamlet "has not succumbed at an early
stage to the beguilement of 'to die, to sleep.' He has kept up the necessary struggle, but he has
learned in the process the futility of self-designed plans, and especially of impatience. To the
relief of an audience agitated by restlessness, Hamlet shows the way towards rest" (141-142).
Eugene England contends that "'To be' is to 'suffer the slings and arrows of outrageous fortune'
(3.1.55-57) —that is, to find one's being in accepting god's world and his will and in obeying his
commands [...]. Hamlet is finally remembering some things he had purged from his mind in his
capitulation to the ghost—such as Christ's command to 'resist not evil' (Matt. 5.39) and Saint
Paul's version, 'Be not overcome of evil, but overcome evil with good' (Rom. 12.21). He is
choosing to be by trying to 'let be'" (55-60). In my view, instead of "accepting god's world and
his will" as England asserts, Hamlet is giving up his search for sapience, namely, "the knowledge
about the things divine and humane" (Perrott, 45). In his last soliloquy, Hamlet claims: "he that
made us with such large discourse, / Looking before and after" (4.4.9.26-27). However, when he
declares that "I'll wipe away all trivial fond records/ All saws of books, all forms, all pressures
past, / That youth and observation copied there" (1.5.99-101), he is making up his mind not to
"look before," and when he returns from his sea voyage, he is forsaking his "large discourse" to
"look after" and stops pondering over the divine judgment and his soul. When Hamlet is trying to
reconcile with Laertes, the same as Othello, he refers to himself by third person point of view,
and sees himself as a divided self. In front of Laertes, Hamlet proclaims:
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Was ’t Hamlet wronged Laertes? Never Hamlet.
If Hamlet from himself be ta'en away,
And when he’s not himself does wrong Laertes,
Then Hamlet does it not. Hamlet denies it.
Who does it, then? His madness. If’t be so,
Hamlet is of the faction that is wronged.
His madness is poor Hamlet’s enemy.
(5.2.170-176)

If the Hamlet that wronged Laertes by killing Polonius was the Hamlet driven by
madness. Then what manner of man is Hamlet when he is uttering these lines? He does not have
an answer. Forsaking the helps of the intellectual, moral and teleological virtues, he gradually
loses sight of himself in his emotional turmoil.

Osric: You are not ignorant of what excellence Laertes is.
Hamlet: I dare not confess that lest I should compare
With him in excellence, but to know a man well were
to know himself.
(5.2.102.29-32)
In his reply to Osric, Hamlet is implying that it is impossible to know others for he does
not even know himself. And at the end of the play, he has given up his self-searching. Hamlet's
"let be" is a kind of resignation. He stops fighting against both "the figure of destiny" and the
"divine purpose," willingly letting whatever is waiting for him and plotting against him toss him
around. As Soellner argues, "the Hamlet of the play is not a glass of fashion but a frustrated
seeker for an ideal human mold" (184), and his "search is in vain" (193). Hamlet has been
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fighting throughout the play against Claudius, Polonius, Rosencrantz and Guildenstern; but
ironically, he achieves what he desires when on he gives up fighting. The letter written by
Claudius to send Hamlet to death finally gives Hamlet grounded reason to take revenge on him,
and during the fencing fight, Hamlet satisfies his desire for revenge. But the moment Hamlet
completes his revenge, he is arriving at the ultimate annulment of himself–death. Jorgenson
argues that "to the relief of an audience agitated by restlessness, Hamlet shows the way towards
rest" (141-142); however, in the journey of self-discovery, rest may not be the answer.
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CHAPTER 5. KING LEAR: REDEMPTION OF THE SELF

5.1

The Debate about Lear's Redemption

In Macbeth, Othello, and Hamlet, Shakespeare presents the trajectories about how the tragic heroes
lose themselves by avoiding respectively the questions about "what one is," "who one is," and
"what manner of man one should be." In King Lear, however, in spite of the miserable experiences
of both Lear and Cordelia, the hope of redemption is finally provided. Redemption in King Lear
can be interpreted as the process from losing one’s self to reconstituting it and redefining the
meaning in life. Critics’ opinions diverge regarding the question: whether Lear dies in joy or in
despair, and whether Lear redeems himself. One group of critics provide a positive reading of the
play. A. C. Bradley, for instance, calls this play "The Redemption of King Lear,” arguing that Lear
dies in joy. According to Bradley, moral order exists in Lear’s world, and “the business of 'the
gods' with him [Lear]” is to show him the “very end and aim of life" (284) through suffering.
Another group of critics, however, argue for the meaninglessness or incomprehensibility of Lear’s
world, and they contend that the redemption of Lear is unlikely. Stephen Greenblatt, for instance,
interprets King Lear as a play 'haunted by a sense of rituals and beliefs that are no longer
efficacious, that has been emptied out'. Following this nihilistic reading of the play, Greenblatt
holds that “Lear's sorrows are not redeemed; nothing can turn them into joy, but the forlorn hope
of an impossible redemption persists, drained of its institutional and doctrinal significance, empty
and vain, cut off even from a theatrical relation, but like the dream of exorcism, ineradicable”
(119). Whether Lear redeems himself, the key to answer the question, in my view, lies in Lear’s
last lines.
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And my poor fool is hanged. —No, no, no life!
Why should a dog, a horse, a rat have life,
And thou no breath at all? O thou'lt come no more,
Never, never, never, never, never.
[To Edgar?] Pray you, undo this button. Thank you, sir.
O, o, o, o.
Do you see this? Look on her. Look, her lips.
Look there, look there! He dies.4
(5.3.305-309)

The hope of redemption appears only when Cordelia has died and death approaches Lear,
for only at that moment does Lear understand the limit of his power, and at this limit Lear finds
himself once again standing in the proximity of the Other. In “There is: Existence without
Existents,” Emmanuel Levinas writes, "only a being whose solitude has reached a crispation
through suffering, and in relation with death, takes its place on a ground where the relationship
with the other becomes possible" (43). The argument of this paper is that the whole play revolves
around how Lear loses himself because of his egoism, and his redemption is only possible when
he can no longer cling to his old self, but respond to the summon of the Other and assume
responsibility.

4

The analysis of the play is based on Shakespeare, William. The Arden Shakespeare. King Lear. Edited
by R.A. Foakes. Croatia: Arden Shakespeare, 2007.
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5.2

Lear's Self-loss

The tragedy of Lear starts with his attempt to extricate himself from responsibility. Right from
the beginning of the play, Lear announces his intention to hand over his responsibilities to the cares
of his daughters: “Know that we have divided/ In three our kingdom; and ’tis our fast intent/ To
shake all cares and business from our age, / Conferring them on younger strengths, while we/
unburdened crawl toward death” (1.1.36-40). To lead an unburdened life, this is the hypothesis
raised by Lear, but Shakespeare shows the impossibility of such hypothesis by staging the tragedy
of Lear. When Lear gives up his responsibility towards his kingdom and duties towards his
daughters, it is immediately followed by his loss in “who he is.”
To begin with, both Lear’s decision to hand over his kingdom, and the way he divides it
among his three daughters are based upon his self-centered concern. In the first scene of the play,
Lear presents himself as a senile man who is dragging his body on hands and knees towards death,
and he uses it as an excuse to renounce his responsibility as king. Lear announces, “we have this
hour a constant will to publish/ Our daughters’ several dowers, that future strife/ May be prevented
now” (1.1.42-43). These lines, especially the phrases “constant will” and “prevented now,”
demonstrate Lear’s eagerness to live a wrong-free life5 later on and explain his motivation for
resignation.
The last thing Lear needs to take care of before leading the life he desires is concerned with
the issue of division, where the conflict arises between Lear’s personal preference and what the
law ordains. Lear is a biased father, who loves his youngest child the most and wants to leave her
with the most (if not all), so that he can” set [his] rest on [Cordelia’s] kind nursery” (1.1.124). Yet,
he is unable to follow his desire completely, because according to the law on inheritance, the eldest
5

The life Lear envisions is exemplified during his stay at Goneril’s castle before having the fight with her,
namely, hunting, dinning and being served.
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child should get the whole. 6 To solve the conflict, Lear comes up with the idea of a love
ceremony—giving each child according to their merit (declaration of love). Paul A. Jorgenson
calls this ceremony a “love-contest” (94). Yet, it is not a real contest. Both the conversation
between Kent and Gloucester (1.1.1-6) and Lear’s prompt announcement of Goneril’s and Regan’s
dowries demonstrate that Lear has already made up his mind before this event, regarding how to
divide his kingdom among his three daughters. Instead of being a contest, it is simply a pretense
of Lear’s pretending justice, and a way for Lear to enjoy the obedience of his daughters. Paul W.
Kahn criticizes Lear’s method of dividing his kingdom, and summarizes the legal and ethical
violations that are involved: “The kingdom is denied the unitary king that it needs if it is to avoid
civil war. The eldest child is not getting the whole that she deserves by law” (5). Accordingly,
instead of preventing strife as he claims, Lear himself accelerates its arrival because of his selfish
concern.
The other thing falling out of Lear’s expectation is the fact that the love ceremony is a
bargain—exchange power for love and care— in which he is doomed to lose. On the one hand,
Cordelia refuses to participate in the trade with Lear. On the other, although Goneril and Regan do
proclaim love and submission as Lear demanded, their love and submission are only conditioned
upon the possible giving from Lear. Without realizing this, Lear gives up his responsibility as king,
and the moment he gives up responsibility, he is also handing over his power. The Fool compares
Lear to “an O without a figure” (1.4.183). “O” resembles the shape of a crown, the symbol of king.
Without the support of either love or power, the name of king is reduced to nothing.
Avoiding the king’s responsibility, Lear loses his identity as king. Avoiding paternal
responsibility, Lear loses his identity as father. Although Lear claims that he loves Cordelia the

6

This idea comes from Paul W. Kahn’s book, Law and Love: The Trials of King Lear.
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most, he disowns her when the latter fails to satisfy his demand. Regarding Lear’s relationship
with Goneril and Regan, except giving them the dowries he promised, throughout the play, Lear
assumes none of paternal responsibilities he owes them but keeps demanding and relying on them.
Goneril and Regan, in return, understand their relation with Lear merely in terms of giving. Once
Lear has nothing to give, they refuse to respect him as father. If with Cordelia, Lear takes the
initiative to give up his identity as father, then with Goneril and Regan, he loses it involuntarily.
When Lear bargains with his two elder daughters about the number of knights he can keep, he is
actually fighting to protect his social and familial position. As Lear mentions, he does not need the
knights, but keeping the number he wants is a signal that he can still have his way, enjoying the
respect and compromise from his daughters. However, this is a bargain decided by either love or
power, and since Lear has neither, he is doomed to lose the bargain.
“What manner he is” is the second part of a man’s self-knowledge. It denotes the
understanding of his “intellect, character, and temperament” by which man becomes an individual.
“No inclinations, complexions, and traits must negate the demand that man fulfill his essence and
what he ought to be. That means he must search for wisdom and control the perturbations of mind”
(Soellner, 308). In the case of Lear, when he loses both his social and family identity, in the
intermingled passion of regret and anger, he feels the danger that he may break into madness. "O
let me not be mad, not mad, sweet heaven!” Lear cries out, “I would not be mad. Keep me in
temper, I would not be mad" (1.5.43-45). However, he forgets his responsibility towards himself
(“controlling the perturbations of mind”) when he is locked out by Regan, and he gives in to the
overwhelming anger and melancholy that drive him mad. According to description of the knight,
Lear is—
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Contending with the fretful elements.
Bids the winds blow the earth into the sea
Or swell the curled water 'bove the main,
That things might change or cease. Tears his white hair,
Which the impetuous blasts, with eyeless rage,
Catch in their fury and make nothing of.
Strives in his little world of man to outscorn
The to-and-fro–conflicting wind and rain.
This night—wherein the cub-drawn bear would couch,
The lion and the belly-pinched wolf
Keep their fur dry—unbonneted he runs,
And bids what will take all.
(3.1.4-14)
Lear’s mental world is reduced to chaos at this moment. He loses the idea of who he is as
well as the ability to maintain the manner he should be because he does not understand “what he
is,” the third part that constitutes man’s self-understanding. “Man is primarily a soul chained to a
body for a short period.” Soellner cites Sr. James Perrot, and “the Renaissance attitude toward selfknowledge was, for one thing, determined by the basic postulate to understand the nature of body
and soul, of matter and spirit, and of their relationship” (308-311). Compared to the impermanent
parts of a person, the soul is the “spiritual or material part […] considered in relation to God and
religious and moral precepts” ("soul"). And to develop an understanding of the soul and establish
relation with God, one needs to establish the ethical relation with men. In Totality and Infinity,
Levinas writes,

There can be no "knowledge" of God separated from the relationship
with men. The Other is the very locus of metaphysical truth, and is
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indispensable for my relation with God. He does not play the role of
a mediator. The Other is not the incarnation of God, but precisely in
his face, in which he is disincarnate, is the manifestation of the
height in which God is revealed. It is our relations with men [...] that
give to theological concepts the sole signification they admit of.
(78)

However, the ethical relation with the Other is missing in Lear before he sinks into madness.
When Lear is obsessed with his self-centered love ceremony, it is Cordelia who calls in question
his egoist concern and reminds him of his responsibility towards the Other. The relationship
between Lear and Cordelia is different from that between Lear and his elder daughters, who are
merely “a second copy” of Lear in the sense of being self-concerned. With respect to this, the Fool
makes a precise comment: “I marvel what kin you [Lear] and thy daughters [Goneril and Regan]
are” (1.4.173). The relationship between Lear, Goneril and Regan is reduced to the totalitarian
relationship between One and the Same. Cordelia’s relation with Lear, by contrast, manages to
escape form the grasp of the Same. For Lear, Cordelia is the Other whom he can neither control
nor comprehend. She is unpredictable, resists against Lear’s power to thematize her, and keeps
reminding Lear of the responsibility that he tries to avoid. When Lear accuses Cordelia of being
“untender” (1.1.107), he does not simply refer to her disobedience but also to her cruelty (from
Lear’s perspective) in overthrowing his plan to lead a life that is free from worries and
responsibilities. The face of Cordleia is that which Lear, in his self-concern, cannot bear. When
Lear bellows, “hence, and avoid my sight!” (1.1.126), he is shunning not simply his paternal
responsibility but also his ethical obligations towards Cordelia as the Other, who refuses to be
subjected to his design.
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If Lear’s responsibility towards Cordelia as his child is decided by social norms and by a
father’s instinctual love, then his responsibility towards her as the Other is decided by the preoriginal aspect that defines what he is. The understanding of “what man is” is the fundamental part
of a man’s self-knowledge, upon which his understanding of “who he is” and “what manner he
should be” is formed. Denying the ethical relationship with the Other, Lear gradually loses his
soul7 as well as the relation with the divine, which is established through the relation with the
Other.
The play King Lear stages the process how Lear’s self-understanding is lost when he tries
to escape from responsibility. Avoiding his responsibility for his kingdom, Lear loses his identity
as a king; when he replaces paternal responsibility with self-righteous justice, he loses his identity
as a father. (1.4.218). Forgetting his responsibility towards himself to control the “disturbance of
his mind,” he loses the control of the manner he should be. Last but not the least, when Lear shuns
the responsibility towards the Other, he loses his soul and the understanding of what he is.
Yet, it is the experience of losing his self that allows Lear to separate himself from his past
and from the identities he appropriates for himself according to familial custom and social power.
In his madness, Lear re-finds his responsibility towards the Other, which shows the possibility of
redemption that transcends his self-concern. As James Hatley comments, "madness is not simply
a defect, a failure of consciousness to be adequately conscious of itself, but also the symptom of a
radical movement, a counter-currentwise traversing of consciousness that always already has been
disturbing consciousness's confident and intentional grasp upon the world" (36).

7

And in the storm, he suffers from sickness, losing the health of his body as well.
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5.3

The Hope of Redemption

In the shelter scene in act 3, readers witness the turning point of Lear. The concern about others
starts to take the place of Lear's occupation with his himself:

This tempest will not give me leave to ponder
On things would hurt me more. But I’ll go in.
(to FOOL) In, boy. Go first. You houseless poverty—
Nay, get thee in. I’ll pray, and then I’ll sleep.
Poor naked wretches, whereso'er you are,
That bide the pelting of this pitiless storm,
How shall your houseless heads and unfed sides,
Your looped and windowed raggedness, defend you
From seasons such as these? Oh, I have ta'en
Too little care of this! Take physic, pomp.
Expose thyself to feel what wretches feel,
That thou mayst shake the superflux to them
And show the heavens more just.
(3.4.24-37)

Exposed in the storm, being sheltered-less, Lear is temporarily liberated from himself, and
allows the concern for the Other to occupy him. “This tempest will not give me leave to ponder/
On things would hurt me more” (3.4.24-25). The “me” Lear points out here is his empirical ego,
the ego, in Levinas’s terms, “already posited and fully identical, as a trial that would lead it to
being more conscious of itself, and make it more apt to put itself in the place of others” (116). For
Lear, when the “me” is out-voiced by the tempest, the order between me and the Other is reversed.
“In, boy. Go first” (3.4.26), Lear sais. The Other is always already before me. And there is always
already an inequality. The shelter scene is the key moment in this play, where the idea of “being
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host to the neighbor” first shows up, in contrast to the hostility demonstrated by Goneril and Regan
in the previous scenes. For Shakespeare as well as for Levinas, to be host signifies to welcome—
saying “go first,” to be exposed, and to take up responsibility for the wretchedness of the Other.
Yet, this is only the first step Lear takes towards responsibility and restoration of himself,
and it is not yet his ultimate redemption. At his reunion with Cordelia, Lear continues to avoid her
face. In act 4 scene 7, Cordelia cries out: “O, look upon me, sir, /And hold your hands in
benediction o'er me!” (4.7.57-58), indicating that Lear is still unable to stand in front of her as the
Other. Moreover, in the last scene of the play, when Cordelia asks: “Shall we not see these
daughters and these sisters?” (5.3.6), Lear immediately responds:

No, no, no, no! Come, let’s away to prison.
We two alone will sing like birds i' th' cage.
When thou dost ask me blessing, I’ll kneel down
And ask of thee forgiveness. So we’ll live,
And pray, and sing, and tell old tales, and laugh
At gilded butterflies, and hear poor rogues
Talk of court news, and we’ll talk with them too—
Who loses and who wins, who’s in, who’s out—
And take upon ’s the mystery of things
As if we were God’s spies. And we’ll wear out
In a walled prison packs and sects of great ones
That ebb and flow by the moon.
(5.3.7-19)

The four "no" shows Lear's anxiety about seeing his two elder daughters, and his previous
desire to lead a worry-free life with Cordelia comes back, and in the fairytale-like life he envisions,
what is going on in the world does not concern him, but merely serves as topics of his chatter.
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Besides, such life with Cordelia is what Lear wants, and he attempts to impose it upon Cordelia.
Lear does not understand that the ethical relation with the Other is only possible by listening to the
summon of the Other and taking up responsibility for him/her until the death scene of Cordelia.

And my poor fool is hanged. —No, no, no life!
Why should a dog, a horse, a rat have life,
And thou no breath at all? O thou'lt come no more,
Never, never, never, never, never.
[To Edgar?] Pray you, undo this button. Thank you, sir.
O, o, o, o.
Do you see this? Look on her. Look, her lips.
Look there, look there! He dies.8
(5.3.305-309)

These lines are highly paradoxical but crucial. The five times Lear utters “never” affirm
Cordelia’s death, conveying his mixed feelings of pain, helplessness, and despair. And the line
“pray you, unto this button” (5.3.324) is a gesture of begging for relief from the suffocating
sufferance. Yet, it is at this moment of utmost helplessness, when Lear is no longer able to use the
Other to satisfy his own desire, that he finally finds himself in the proximity of Cordelia as the
Other. When Lear cries out, “do you see this? Look on her. Look, her lips, / Look there, look there”
(5.3.308-309). It is important that Lear mentions Cordelia’s lips, as if she were addressing him,
soliciting a response from Lear. And finally, Lear pays attention to Cordelia’s summon. This scene

8

The analysis of the play is based on Shakespeare, William. The Arden Shakespeare. King Lear. Edited
by R.A. Foakes. Croatia: Arden Shakespeare, 2007.
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corresponds with Levinas’s idea that “only a being whose solitude has reached a crispation through
suffering, and in relation with death, takes its place on a ground where the relationship with the
other becomes possible" (43).
The interpersonal relationship, especially between Lear and Coredia, in King Lear deepens
our understanding of Levinas’s idea that the pre-originary responsibility towards the Other defines
who and what man is. I shall argue that Levinasian ethics between Other and the self is not
necessarily a step beyond the self-fashioning in King Lear, but ethical relation is the fundamental
part of self-fashioning. Man can only come to the realization of “what he is” by leaving aside the
pure concern for himself, and reaching out to the Other. Levinas explains the pre-originary
responsibility one bears towards the Other; Shakespeare stages both the consequences when one
forgets his responsibility, and the possibility of redemption. In the case of Lear, he loses his self
since he forgets his responsibilities, and even after his re-union with Cordelia, he falls back to his
egoist self. Only when Cordelia dies and Lear’s own death is approaching, the hope of Lear’s
redemption gleams, for only at that moment Lear completely leaves aside the egoist concern for
himself, and finally stand in the proximity of the Other. It is through re-establishing the relation
with the Other that Lear redeems and restores himself.
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CONCLUSION

In this study, the first chapter traces the paradigm shift about the conception of the self from the
Greco-Roman tradition to the Renaissance. It lays special stress on James Perrott's system of selfstudy since to some degree, Perrott's idea about the self represents the main stream Renaissance
humanists' understanding of the topic. It serves as a reference point to examine how Shakespeare
shares and corresponds to such understanding. The following three chapters focus on how
Shakespeare stages the three questions raised by James Perrott concerning self-understanding, that
is, what one is, who one is, and what manner of man one is?
In Chapter 2, it is argued that Macbeth's self-destruction is not brought about by his fear.
Instead, it is Macbeth's avoidance of fear that plunges him into self-lost, and he gradually forgets
about the question concerning what he is. In Chapter 3, the discussion about Othello's self-loss is
conducted against the context of the Renaissance family. One's understanding of who he is depends
on the relation to his family and his social status. In Othello, the inclination for self-denial under
paternal power turns Desdemona into a blind wife and Othello into a jealous husband, and it leads
to their tragic marriage. Chapter 4 focuses on the question of what manner one should be. By
"manner," it refers to man's education, prudence, and perturbation of mind. Trapped in his
problematic relation with his three parents, Hamlet fails to restore his self-understand for he
forsakes the help of intellectual, moral and theological virtues.
The last chapter discusses the process of Lear's redemption. It traces Lear's trajectory of
forgetting all three questions concerning self-understanding. However, the hope of redeeming
oneself is found when Lear resumes his responsibility towards others.

This is the main

demarcation between Shakespeare and Perrott. While Perrott emphasizes the help of intellectual
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and theoretical virtues, Shakespeare shows the ethical relationship with others as the key to redeem
oneself and restore one's self-understanding.
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